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Abstract
This work supports the thesis that sound quantitative evaluation for spam filters leads to
substantial improvement in the classification of email. To this end, new laboratory testing
methods and datasets are introduced, and evidence is presented that their adoption at
Text REtrieval Conference (TREC)and elsewhere has led to an improvement in state of
the art spam filtering. While many of these improvements have been discovered by others,
the best-performing method known at this time – spam filter fusion – was demonstrated
by the author.
This work describes four principal dimensions of spam filter evaluation methodology
and spam filter improvement. An initial study investigates the application of twelve
open-source filter configurations in a laboratory environment, using a stream of 50,000
messages captured from a single recipient over eight months. The study measures the
impact of user feedback and on-line learning on filter performance using methodology
and measures which were released to the research community as the TREC Spam Filter
Evaluation Toolkit.
The toolkit was used as the basis of the TREC Spam Track, which the author co-
founded with Cormack. The Spam Track, in addition to evaluating a new application
(email spam), addressed the issue of testing systems on both private and public data.
While streams of private messages are most realistic, they are not easy to come by and
cannot be shared with the research community as archival benchmarks. Using the toolkit,
participant filters were evaluated on both, and the differences found not to substantially
confound evaluation; as a result, public corpora were validated as research tools. Over
the course of TREC and similar evaluation efforts, a dozen or more archival benchmarks
– some private and some public – have become available.
The toolkit and methodology have spawned improvements in the state of the art ev-
ery year since its deployment in 2005. In 2005, 2006, and 2007, the spam track yielded
new best-performing systems based on sequential compression models, orthogonal sparse
bigram features, logistic regression and support vector machines. Using the TREC partic-
ipant filters, we develop and demonstrate methods for on-line filter fusion that outperform
all other reported on-line personal spam filters.
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Sound quantitative evaluation is essential:
• to measure the extent to which email spam filters are effective for their intended
purpose;
• to assess the relative effectiveness of current filtering techniques;
• to investigate the worthiness of new techniques.
This thesis describes the development and application of a novel methodology for labo-
ratory spam filter evaluation. Specifically, the evaluation methodology[37] was designed
and used to study eight on-line open source spam filters. The methodology was encapsu-
lated and made available to the public as the Spam Filtering Evaluation Toolkit[81]. In
conjunction with the toolkit, several private and public corpora were developed to eval-
uate filters[36]. Both the methodology and toolkit were used in a large scale evaluation
of independent filters at the Text Retrieval Conference (TREC) Spam Evaluation Track
[30, 33, 34]. Finally, the best known spam filtering method was created by exploiting the
evaluation toolkit to combine the results of multiple filters [83].
1.2 Objectives
A spam filter is something that identifies spam email (i.e. unwanted bulk email[1, 127]) so
as to prevent its delivery. Filters can mitigate the negative impact of spam, provided that
1
2 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
they act in a reliable and predictable manner, eliminating a large portion of unwelcome
email, and posing a minimal risk of eliminating welcome email. No filter is perfect;
however, neither are the human email recipients who bear the burden of identifying
spam, absent a filter. The cost of reading every email is greater than just time [21]. Some
users only read the subject or look at the email briefly before deciding it is spam. This
may lead the user to mistake a wanted email as spam and ignoring it or worse, deleting
it. I, for one, have missed or deleted real emails thinking the messages were spam. This
is one of the reasons I became interested in spam filtering. Filters also make mistakes but
can be used in conjunction with users to minimize these errors. These considerations all
beg the question: How well do spam filters work?
To answer this question, one has to answer a variety of questions.
What is spam?
Spam is more than just unwanted email. A spam email is a message that contains a
payload the sender wishes to deliver, despite the wishes of the recipient. The payload
could be any of a number of schemes from advertising to a bait for fraud. Some of the
gains made by the sender of spam are money, control of computers, or extracting personal
information. We must have a precise definition of spam in order to find how well filters
work.
What is a spam filter?
A spam filter is a computer program that classifies email messages, determining with high
probability whether or not a message is spam. Once the filter has identified a message as
spam, it may be labeled or flagged, removed from the inbox to a spam folder, or simply
deleted. The filter identifies a message as spam through any number of methods which
include comparing it statistically to previously received email, examining who sent the
message, or matching known keywords and patterns.
How does one quantify spam filter performance?
A perfect spam filter would identify every spam message as spam and every non-spam
message as non-spam. A näıve measure of filter performance is accuracy, the fraction of
all messages that are correctly identified by the filter. Accuracy gives little indication of
the relative risk of identifying spam as non-spam or vice versa. And a vacuous filter that
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identifies every message as spam, although useless, may achieve a high accuracy score.
Such a filter would score 95% accuracy in a typical environment where 95% of messages
were spam. Accuracy measures the prevalence of spam as much as it measures filter
performance.
A better approach is to measure separately the fraction of spam identified to be
non-spam (false negative rate) and the fraction of non-spam identified to be spam (false
positive rate). If one filter has both a lower false positive and false negative rate than
another, it is clearly superior. But if one rate is higher and the other lower, comparison
is more difficult. Summary measures that aptly characterize overall performance are
needed.
What is the best method to evaluate realistic spam filter performance?
The ultimate objective is an evaluation methodology that aptly models and measures real
filter behaviour. The evaluation should also be repeatable. These constraints are some-
what contradictory due to the real-time nature of the email delivery process. Some filters
will use external resources that are nearly impossible to capture. These external resources
are changed by their use; they are also updated from other sources, for example, by other
filters. For filter development, repeatable evaluation has considerable importance as it is
essential to compare proposed techniques and enhancements. To this end, we consider
laboratory evaluation methods using archived data, as opposed to in situ measurements.
A laboratory evaluation may restrict the filter’s interaction with external entities, it
may capture their states, or it may simulate their behaviour. An example of restricting
the filter’s interaction is the prohibition of challenge-response or greylisting techniques.
A primary example of captured state is a complete chronological email stream, along
with timing information, and the “true” classification of each message. An example of
simulation is the user’s behaviour in providing feedback to the filter.
Filter deployment may be simulated in the laboratory using a framework that presents
a stream of email messages to the filter, captures the filter’s result, and evaluates the
captured result. A standard interface allows different filters and message streams to be
tested, without requiring any test-specific modifications to either.
Once we can measure filter effectiveness in a repeatable experiment, we may com-
pare results to address the question of which filters work better than others, and, more
importantly, what novel approaches improve on established ones.
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1.3 Results
A laboratory study of the effectiveness of real spam filters for on-line filtering of real email
was completed. The study reports the comparative evaluation in a realistic controlled
environment of commonly-deployed spam filters applied to a sequence of all email deliv-
ered to an individual within a specific time interval. During the process of completing the
study a novel methodology for evaluating spam filters was developed. Measures were de-
veloped to reflect a filter’s effectiveness for its intended purpose; i.e. abating spam while
preserving welcome email messages. In conducting the study it became clear a standard
plug-in method of running filters was needed. The Spam Filter Evaluation Toolkit was
created to meet this need.
The goal in creating the Spam Filter Evaluation Toolkit is to increase the availability
of appropriate evaluation techniques for use by industry and academia, including the
deployment of new evaluation techniques that simulate different modes of deployment.
The toolkit has provided a standard evaluation of current and proposed spam filtering
approaches. It also provides an architecture, common tools and methodology for an
open-ended network of evaluation corpora (public and private) by establishing a standard
interface for evaluating spam filter performance. The toolkit has also been widely used
by researchers creating and studying spam filters. Notably, this toolkit is the foundation
of evaluation for the TREC spam track.[30]
The Text Retrieval Conference, TREC, is an annual conference hosted by the U.S.
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) whose goal is
“to increase the availability of appropriate evaluation techniques for use by
industry and academia, including the deployment of new evaluation techniques
more applicable to current systems.”1
With Cormack, I co-founded the TREC Spam Track to explore, develop and evaluate
spam filtering techniques at the conference. Groups from around the world have partici-
pated in the TREC spam track. These groups submit their filter to TREC for evaluation;
the results are published at the conference where the groups describe their spam filtering
techniques. The TREC spam filtering evaluations were completed using the Spam Filter-
ing Evaluation Toolkit. The spam track ran in TREC 2005, TREC 2006 and TREC 2007.
Each year, significant improvements in spam filtering techniques have been achieved.
1trec.nist.gov
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A novel aspect of the TREC Spam Track, facilitated by the toolkit, was the submission
of participant filters for evaluation on private data, in addition to the more traditional
evaluation on public data. Realistic email data are very difficult to acquire, and in general
cannot be distributed. The Spam Track answered affirmatively the outstanding question
of whether measurements on publishable data agree with those on more realistic private
data.
The standard interface enforced by the toolkit makes available a large number of
plug-in filters that, in addition to being compared, can be combined into an ensemble.
Using the filters submitted to TREC, an on-line fusion technique was developed that
consistently improves on the performance of the best individual filter. To this date, the
developed fusion technique yields the best published results on all datasets amenable for




In 2004, my personal motivation was to find a solution to the spam that was filling my
mailbox. My task was to find the most effective way to eliminate spam while minimizing
the risk of eliminating real mail. The easiest option would have been to install one of
the many available open source spam filters; however, I was interested in learning more
about how filters work and believed a better filter was still possible. To achieve this, I
decided to create my own filter.
Having just started my Doctorate of Philosophy when spam filtering became a topic
of much interest, I decided to make it the focus of research for my thesis. I tackled this
interesting problem by breaking it into three steps:
1. Learn how spam is filtered.
2. Determine the best spam methods.
3. Improve on the best methods.
This chapter will cover an overview for each step of my doctorate plan and why the last
two steps became much more complicated when explored in detail.
2.1 Understanding Spam Filtering
To learn how spam is filtered, it must be defined before describing how the process is
completed. Although methods vary greatly, spam filtering has a well-defined purpose.
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What is Spam?
Even defining what appears to be a simple term quickly became complex. Early definitions
like “unsolicited commercial email” [63] do not appear to capture the public consensus
on the nature of spam. A great deal of effort may be expended in determining whether
or not email is commercial, when for practical purposes this aspect has little impact
on the user’s perception. The looser definition “unwanted email” fails to capture the
indiscriminate nature of spam, and is nearly impossible to adjudicate in an objective and
repeatable manner.
I propose a formal definition in chapter 3, which was used for TREC and is used
throughout the thesis. Even so, there may be uncertainty about the true class of any par-
ticular message, either because of disagreement in interpreting the definition or because
a user is simply unsure. Some evaluations exclude such messages; such exclusion tends to
inflate performance measurements while introducing a new uncertainty: which messages
should be included and excluded from the evaluation? The philosophy employed here is
that the definition should be as precise as possible, and the truth should be determined
as accurately as possible relative to the definition. The effect of different definitions is
itself amenable to measurement.
How is Spam Filtered?
Figure 2.1 shows the delivery of an email stream including filtering. It begins with the
arrival of an email message addressed to a particular recipient. The message is given to
the spam filter, which classifies the mail as spam or ham (non-spam) using a variety of
methods. If the filter classification is ham, the message is delivered to a ham file (inbox)
which the user reads systematically. The user may identify incorrectly classified spam
delivered to the inbox and correct the spam filter via the mail reading interface. The
user does not systematically read the email classified as spam but may search or browse
it occasionally to find and retrieve any mislabeled email.
Spam filtering differs from classical text categorization [111] in that spam evolves.
There is a never-ending battle between those who create spam and those who create
spam filters. For this reason, filters must be able to be updated frequently. Filter update
strategies are as varied as filter methods. Updates fall into two types: manual and learned.
A manual update involves an actual person changing the filter. This could be as simple
as adding the rule that all email with the term Viagra are spam. With learned update,
the filter will find content of the email that indicate spam or non-spam by using known
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Figure 2.1: Spam Filter Usage
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classified email. The time frame that filters update may only occur every few months or
can happen very frequently (after every new email) or everything in between.
The process shown in figure 2.1 demonstrates an on-line update process. One message
is processed and classified at a time. Before the next message is processed, the filter may
adapt based on the information it receives, which is often referred to as training. The
information could include user feedback, features in the email and such. External sources
of information such as DNSBL1, that many filters use, can be added to the process.
When the filter trains on more than one email at a time, the process is referred to as
batch training. A very common batch filtering approach is to update the filter on a set
of training email and then use the updated filter on real incoming email. This filter may
be updated again after some number of email. Some learning filters take vast resources
to complete training; these filters are usually updated using the batch process.
Based on this model presented in figure 2.1, the filter can learn what is spam and ham
email for a particular user by using the user’s feedback to update the filter’s memory.
A perfect spam filter would avoid ham misclassification – incorrectly placing a ham
message in the spam file – and spam misclassification – incorrectly placing a spam mes-
sage in the ham file. Ham misclassification poses a serious risk; should the recipient fail to
retrieve the misclassified message from the spam file, it would be lost. Spam misclassifi-
cation, on the other hand, exposes the recipient to a degree of the original inconvenience,
annoyance and risk associated with spam. An effective filter should mitigate the effects
of spam while maintaining an acceptable risk of loss.
Typically a filter will estimate the likelihood that the classified message is spam.
If the estimate (a spamminess score) is over some threshold the filter will classify the
message as spam. Because the relative risks and costs associated with ham and spam
misclassification may vary from one situation to another, most spam filters, in addition
to classifying each email message, have a threshold parameter which may be adjusted to
decrease ham misclassification at the expense of spam misclassification, or vice versa.
With the goal of removing spam from my inbox, I decided to focus this research
toward on-line personal learning filters.
1DNS Blacklist is a list of DNS addresses linked to spamming
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2.2 Spam Filtering circa 2004
In 2004 when this research was initiated, there was considerable diversity – and consider-
able controversy – in the methods applied to spam filtering and the means by which these
methods were evaluated. It was not at all clear which methods were best, and which held
the most promise for improvement.
These issues were addressed by three distinct communities: (1) the community of
developers and practitioners whose motivation was to build tools for immediate deploy-
ment; (2) the community of spam filter vendors whose motivation was to sell spam filters;
(3) the research community whose motivation was to discover new truth or to validate
existing theories and algorithms.
The methods employed and investigated by users, practitioners, vendors and re-
searchers, may be broadly categorized as:
• manual inspection;
• systems-oriented approaches;
• content based filters.
Content-based filters may be further categorized as:
• ad hoc rule-based filters;
• practical learning filters, dubbed “Bayesian”, derived from the work of Graham[55,
56] and Robinson[102, 101, 100];
• laboratory-oriented methods of machine-learning research.
Manual inspection
The obvious alternative to automatic spam filtering is to deliver all email to the end user,
who examines each message and decides whether or not to treat it as spam. The user
acting in this capacity may be regarded as a human spam filter, with associated cost and
risks not unlike those for automatic filters. While the cost in terms of time is obvious,
it is not necessarily easy to quantify[62]. Furthermore, the risk of error is not zero, as is
sometimes assumed in comparing the risks and benefits of automatic filtering.
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Users may believe that they can do a better job than filters. In one study Yerazunis[132]
diligently adjudicated a collection of email on two different occasions. Yerazunis diligently
examined the full email (headers and text) and found a disagreement rate of 0.16%. It is
likely other diligent users should expect an error rate similar to 0.16%. In reality average
users’ error rates are much higher. Anecdotally, the author is aware of several instances
of users overlooking important email that happened to look like spam.
Filtering by hand requires time and, as the percent of spam increases, so does the
time requirement. When spam is infrequent, human filtering is a practical solution as
extra work is minimal and mistakes extremely rare. As the spam increases, so does the
workload, as well as mistakes.
Human filters have an advantage of full knowledge of what the user thinks is spam or
not spam. The disadvantage is that humans make mistakes which could mean deleting
the wrong email. Users also do not have easy access to external resources that might
indicate an email is spam such as DNS Blacklists.2
“Systems” approaches
Systems approaches rely on information extrinsic to the message and the user in identify-
ing spam. They are typically applied before the email is delivered to the user. Common
methods employ lists of good senders (white lists), lists of bad senders (black lists), or
lists of particular spam messages (fingerprint lists). These lists may be created and
maintained by system administrators, or they may be maintained collaboratively, with
end-users contributing list elements as they are discovered.
In contrast to the methods above, greylisting and challenge-response elicit some par-
ticular behaviour from the sender and assume that the message is spam if this behaviour
is not observed. Each introduces delay, additional network traffic, and risk of message
loss.
System approaches are employed by both practitioners and vendors. Due to the
dynamic real-time nature of many system approaches, their effectiveness is difficult to
measure, and few results appear in the literature.
A white list is a list of senders (user, domains, or IP addresses) that are safe addresses.
The safe addresses are acquaintances or not known for sending spam. White lists are used
to override a spam filter so that all messages from senders in the white list are classified
2DNS Blacklist is a list of DNS addresses linked to spamming
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as ham. Though white lists can reduce the chance of a real message being classified as
spam, the downfall is that all email from the senders in the list is classified as ham. If a
spammer can spoof one of the addresses in the white list, spam will be misclassified as
ham. It is very common for spammers to exploit this weakness to get spam to the users.
It is actually relatively easy to find addresses in the white list. One simple example is
email addresses being on the same website. If users addresses are on a website because
they know each other or work together, there is a strong likelihood they are in each other’s
white lists. It is too easy for spammers to spoof the sender ID that white lists use as an
indication of ham.[80]
A black list[29, 89] differs from a white list in that senders in white lists are classified
as ham, where senders in a black list are classified as spam. One of the problems with
black lists is that spam comes from so many different sources that a single user’s black list
is too incomplete to be effective. In order to be more effective, much larger black lists are
compiled using many users. Two examples of this are Real-time Black lists (RBL) and
DNS Black lists (DNSBL). Spam filters can both query and add to the lists. Blacklists
can cause false positives because a genuine email sender may have been spoofed by a
spammer. The real-time update of black lists makes repeatable evaluation very difficult.
The black list’s state would need to be captured at each point in time in the testing
corpus.
Another system spam filter approach is greylisting[79, 60]; a method for filtering
spam by temporarily rejecting all email from unknown senders by the mail server as it is
received. A properly configured mail server will resend the message and the email will be
delivered to the user. The theory is that the spammer will not resend the messages. The
advantage is that because it is not well used, spammers do not usually resend messages;
therefore, it reduces spam. It also requires no additional architecture at the user’s end.
The impact on the user is a delay in the first email from a sender, as well as possible
lost messages from misconfigured mail servers. Spammers can easily outflank greylisting
simply by resending the messages. Another drawback is that some sender mail servers
will warn the senders about the temporary rejection leading to confusion. One common
delay is when a user creates an account on a new website, the confirmation email will
be delayed by greylisting. This can be frustrating to the user who is accustom to the
instantaneous nature of email.
Collaborative filtering[115, 75, 74, 44, 42] is a system approach that exploits the fact
that the same spam email is sent to many different users. A collaborative spam filter
must capture spam and be able to recognize duplicates over a large number of systems.
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Finding spam is as easy as setting up an email address. If an email address is never
used for legitimate email, all email received will be spam. Due to privacy, messages need
to be encrypted; this would limit the ability to find near duplicates. Any user-specific
header information could not be used. Also, due to the volume of spam it would be
impossible to store complete messages. Collaborative spam filtering could only be as
effective as its completeness. The greater the completeness the more complicated and
delayed judgements would be.
A more intrusive suggested system approach is challenge response[61, 24, 25, 118,
97, 22] filtering which adds a cost to sending an email. The cost should be easy for
a legitimate sender but time consuming or costly for a spammer to send millions of
spam. Examples of challenge response are asking the user to resend, clicking a link,
and making a payment. An email is usually sent to the user with instructions how to
respond. This causes legitimate mail to be lost by autonomous sender’s web transaction
confirmations and such, as there is no one to respond. This make the use of challenge
response unfavorable.[58]
Ad hoc Content-Based Methods
Almost all email systems provide a mechanism to filter messages based on keywords or
simple patterns. Early spam filters used these mechanisms to identify words like “Viagra”
likely to occur in spam. SpamAssassin[121] generalizes this approach, using a wide variety
of rules composed by authors and users to identify spam.
In 2004 SpamAssassin was the most popular open source filter that exploited rules
as one of its methods. By default SpamAssassin had approximately 800 rules, each
having a score. New rules and scores may be added or old ones may be customized to
improve performance for a specific user. SpamAssassin also embedded white list, black
list, fingerprint as “rules”. SpamAssassin’s popularity was also a hindrance as spammers
would test spam against SpamAssassin. An example of a SpamAssassin rule named
OFFER is
body OFFER /free offer/i
score OFFER 1.0
If the body contains the text “free offer” the messages score is increased by 1.0. SpamAs-
sassin default threshold is 5.0; anything over that score is classified as spam. The default
threshold can be easily changed.
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“Bayesian” Filters
Graham’s influential essay, “A Plan for Spam,”[55] reported very good results using
a simple content-based classifier. The technique was improved by Robinson[100] and
became the de-facto standard for practical content-based spam filtering. While it is not a
pure näıve Bayes classifier, and a number of derivative methods bear even less similarity
to näıve Bayes; the entire class of methods has come to be known as “Bayesian Spam
Filtering.” A large number of stand-alone filters employing the technique, including
SpamBayes, Bogofilter and SpamProbe remain in common use. Other systems, notably
SpamAssassin and Mozilla Mail, adopted the method.
Graham[57, 56] and Robinson’s[102, 101, 100] method decomposes each message into
individual tokens or words, and computes the fraction of spam and the fraction of ham
messages containing each word by examining a number of messages, each known to be
spam or ham. In classifying a new message, words in the message that occur more
frequently in spam are taken as evidence that the message is spam, and vice versa. Once
the message has been read by the user and definitively labeled as spam or ham, it may
be used to update the computed fractions, in accordance with on-line deployment (figure
2.1).
As of 2004 Bayesian spam filters were heavily utilized by developers and practitioners
and explored by researchers. Due to the user interaction worries, it was not a method
used by vendors at the time.
Learning research methods
The research community has investigated a multitude of classification methods. Well-
researched methods for text classification include näıve Bayes classifiers, perceptron[51,
50], winnow[117], support vector machines[124][124], clustering methods such as nearest
neighbor[40, 41], and decision trees[23].
The perceptron algorithm[51, 50] is a linear classifier that separates a data set of items
(emails for spam) into two groups by iteratively attempting to correct all errors by incre-
menting or decrementing weights for incorrectly classified items. The algorithm ignores
correctly classified items. If the items are linearly separable, the perceptron algorithm
converges in a finite number of steps. For non-linear separable items the algorithm must
be stopped after some number of iterations. The perceptron is simple and incremental,
making it useful for spam filtering. The winnow[117] algorithm is closely related to the
16 CHAPTER 2. MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND
perceptron, but computes weights using a multiplicative scheme instead of the percep-
tron’s additive scheme. Similar to the perceptron algorithm, winnow trains on error but
can be adapted to train on close calls.
Of all the researched text classification methods, support vector machine (SVM) have
been touted the most effective[124][124]. SVMs are linear classifiers which have been
shown to yield state-of-the-art performance on text classification by finding a hyperplane
that separates two classes of data while maximizing the margin between them. To calcu-
late the margin, two support vectors are constructed, one on each side of the separating
hyperplane. SVMs require training time that is quadratic in the number of training
examples, therefore, impractical for large scale email systems. As of 2004, some work
was invested in applying SVM to spam; however, there were no known publicly available
filters using SVM.
Nearest neighbor[40, 41] classifier computes the distance between an item and previous
known items based on the features of the items. The item is classified the same as its
closest neighbor. An extension is k-nearest neighbor classifier (kNN) for some fixed k,
the k closest neighbors are found and the majority classification is assigned to the item.
Another classifier that can be used for spam is decision trees[23]. A decision tree
maps observations about an item to conclusions about the item’s classification. To train,
decision trees must successively split train data by using one observation at a time. The
trick is to choose the order in which to examine the observation.
2.3 Spam Filter Evaluation circa 2004
The communities have largely investigated different methods using different approaches,
and reported results in different venues. Even within each community, there is little
consensus as to which methods works best, and incomparable claims abound (see table
2.2). Practitioners and vendors claimed amazing spam filter performance. Researchers
report significantly lower spam filter performance results than the other two groups.
The next section outlines the diverse claims and reporting methods existing at the
outset of this research. The evaluation measures are detailed and contrasted in the
following section.
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2.3.1 Incomparable Claims
Paul Graham[56] contrasts his practical results with those of the research community:
Spam filtering is a subset of text classification, which is a well established
field, but the first papers about Bayesian spam filtering per se seem to have
been two given at the same conference in 1998, one by Pantel and Lin [93],
and another by a group from Microsoft Research [104].3
When I heard about this work I was a bit surprised. If people had been onto
Bayesian filtering four years ago, why wasn’t everyone using it? When I read
the papers I found out why. Pantel and Lin’s filter was the more effective of
the two, but it only caught 92% of spam, with 1.16% false positives.
When I tried writing a Bayesian spam filter, it caught 99.5% of spam with less
than .03% false positives.4 It’s always alarming when two people trying the
same experiment get widely divergent results. It’s especially alarming here
because those two sets of numbers might yield opposite conclusions. Different
users have different requirements, but I think for many people a filtering rate
of 92% with 1.16% false positives means that filtering is not an acceptable
solution, whereas 99.5% with less than .03% false positives means that it is.
Jonathan Zdziarski [136], developer of DSPAM, makes the following claim:
After three months of development, the first public beta of DSPAM v3.2 has
been released for testing. ... Accuracy in 3.x has reportedly peaked as high
as 99.991% (2 errors in 22,786 messages).
Bill Yerazunis[132], developer of CRM114 also claims astounding performance:
CRM114 - the Controllable Regex Mutilator - As of Feb 1 through Feb 21,
2004, 6000+ messages, my total error rate was ONE. That translates to bet-
ter than 99.984% accuracy, which is ten times more accurate than human
accuracy (which I’ve measured to be around 99.84%.)
3Sahami et al.[104] conducted a study 1998 that indicated the utility of Bayesian classifiers for spam
filtering. The best-performing system achieved ham recall of 100% and spam recall of 98.3%.
4At the time I had zero false positives out of about 4,000 legitimate emails. If the next legitimate
email was a false positive, this would give us .03%. These false positive rates are untrustworthy, as I
explain later. I quote a number here only to emphasize that whatever the false positive rate is, it is less
than 1.16%.
18 CHAPTER 2. MOTIVATION AND BACKGROUND
Vendors claim even better performance than practitioners. The following is advertising
from brightmail[19] in 2004.
Researchers have, in contrast, reported surprisingly poor performance. These reports use
a large variety of measures including several that convey little insight into filter behaviour.
Michelakis et al create an SVM based spam filter. Their real-life evaluation results
are detailed in the table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Michelakis et al 2004 Results
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An early study on spam filtering was completed by Pantel and Lin[93] in 1998. They
found that a Bayesian filter did an adequate job of classifying email.
Our experiments show that SpamCop is able to identify about 92% of
spam while misclassifying only about 1.16% of the nonspam e-mails
Sahami[104] et al completed a study in 1998 investigating Bayesian filtering and found
the following:
We find that the filter is in fact quite successful at eliminating 80% of incoming
junk E-mail from the user’s mail stream. For completeness, we also provide
the Precision/Recall curve for this task in [figure 2.2]. Based on these results
we believe that such as system would be practical for usage in commercial
E-mail application.
Figure 2.2: Sahami Precision/Recall curve
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Kolcz and Alspector[73] completed an evaluation using SVM for spam filtering. They
note that ham misclassification can be traded for spam misclassification by changing
the filter threshold for identifying spam. They included receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) analysis in their paper[see section 2.3.3]. Their ROC curve for the evaluated SVM
filter is shown in figure 2.3.
Figure 2.3: Kolcz Alspector ROC curve
Table 2.2 summarizes the major published results as of 2004. Quick analysis of the
table shows more work is needed to determine what the top performing filter is. There
are three problems with making comparisons. One, several different measures are used
in determining filter performance. These measures are described in section 2.3.2. The
second problem in comparing filters is the evaluation architecture is different for each
published performance. The different test apparatus will be discussed in section 2.3.4.
The final problem is each filter is evaluated against a different set of emails with the
exception of the few filters tested by Holden. Test corpora are described in section 2.3.5.
The Holden study is also the only one that is an independent evaluation; that is where
the evaluation was performed independently from the developer of the method.
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2.3.2 Incomparable Measures
As table 2.2 illustrates, there are many different evaluation measures. These are outlined
in this section.
Contingency Table
To measure performance, each message the filter is to be evaluated on must be correctly
judged. These correct judgements are known as the gold standard. Given a set of









Table 2.3: Contingency Table
There are four possible outcomes for given messages; a contingency table (table: 2.3)
displays the number of times each outcome occurs for a set of emails.
• a is the number of ham messages correctly classified by the filter as ham
• b is the number of spam messages incorrectly classified by the filter as ham
• c is the number of ham messages incorrectly classified by the filter as spam
• d is the number of spam messages correctly classified by the filter as spam.
From the contingency table, a number of summary statistics may be deduced:
• Prevalence, prev = b+da+b+c+d , is the fraction of all email that is spam.
• Ham misclassification fraction, hm = ca+c , is the fraction of misclassified ham. hm
is identical to false positive rate (fpr) from signal detection theory; however, the
latter term is often misused in spam filter evaluation, so we chose a more application-
specific one.
• Spam misclassification fraction, sm = bb+d , is the fraction of misclassified spam. In
some literature this is referred to as false negative rate (fnr).
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• Diluted false positive rate, dfpr = ca+b+c+d , is the fraction of all messages that
the filter incorrectly classifies as spam. Many practitioners and vendors incorrectly
report dfpr as fpr.
• Accuracy, acc = a+da+b+c+d , is the overall fraction of messages that are correctly
classified by the filter.
• Overall misclassification fraction m = b+ca+b+c+d = 1 − acc is the fraction of all
messages that the filter incorrectly classifies. Also known as error.
• Spam precision sp = dc+d , often reported simply as precision, is the fraction of
messages classified by the filter as spam that actually are spam. The measure
derives from information retrieval, in which retrieved documents are either relevant
or not. Spam precision assumes that spam messages are relevant. Spam precision
is equivalent to positive predictive value in signal detection theory.
• Spam recall sr = db+d is the fraction of all spam messages that are classified by the
filter to be spam. Identical to 1− sm.
• Ham precision hp = aa+b and ham recall hr =
a
a+c are precision and recall, assuming
ham messages to be relevant. From the perspective of evaluating the effectiveness
of a spam filter for its intended purpose, hp and hr are more apt than sp and sr,
but seldom reported.
2.3.3 Ham/Spam Misclassification Trade off
The consequences of ham and spam misclassification depend on the nature of the messages
and the user’s needs. The separate measures hm and sm characterize filter performance
independent of these considerations, and may be combine with deployment-specific pa-
rameters to quantify the effectiveness of a filter in any particular situation. In particular,
prev varies from one deployment situation to another, as does the user’s relative sensi-
tivity to ham and spam misclassification.
The separate measures, however, make it difficult to compare filter effectiveness. One
approach to comparing filters is to conflate the parameters of one specific deployment
with hm and sm to yield a single measure. This approach is limited to the extent that
the parameters actually capture the deployment-specific consequences, and also to the
extent that the deployment is typical. acc is the simplest such measure, assuming that
the misclassification of a ham or spam message is of equal consequence. Furthermore, it
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is impossible to deduce hm or sm from acc, or to predict acc in a deployment situation
in which prev is different from that of the test environment, even if known.
Androutsopolous et al.[7] argue that the relative importance of ham over spam mis-
classification errors be quantified by a parameter λ used as input to the filter in cost-
sensitive classification and to the evaluation measure in cost-sensitive evaluation. They
define cost-sensitive measures:
• Weighted accuracy is defined as Wacc= λa+dλa+b+λc+d ,
• Total cost ratio is defined as TCR = b+db+λc
where a, b, c, d are taken from the contingency table.
Weighted accuracy alters the deployment-specific consequence of misclassification, but
otherwise has the same shortcomings as acc. In particular, it is sensitive to prev, and a
vacuous filter may achieve a high score. Hidalgo[62] discusses the problem of choosing λ:
The main problem in the literature on [spam] cost-sensitive categorization is
that the [ham-spam cost ratios] used do not correspond to real world con-
ditions, unknown and highly variable. No evidence supports that classifying
a legitimate message as [spam] is 9 nor 999 times worse than the opposite
mistake.
Furthermore, for high values of λ, Wacc is statistically unstable because the score depends
almost entirely on the incorrect classification of only a handful of messages.
Androutsopolous et al. propose TCR that evaluates filters relative to the vacuous
filter. A filter improves on the vacuous filter if Wacc > 1; however, Wacc has little
meaning in terms of the filter’s intended purpose. TCR does not address the other
shortcomings of Wacc.
This criticism – dependence on highly variable external factors, arbitrary filter param-
eters, and arbitrary evaluation weights – applies to a large class of combined evaluation
measures[111].
Precision and recall similarly conflate prev and deployment-specific consequences with
the evaluation measure. It is not possible to deduce hm and sm from precision and recall
alone; however, if prev is also known, it is. Conversely, given hm and sm and prev for
any deployment, precision and recall may be computed.
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The problem of deployment-specific consequences may be addressed by exposing a
threshold parameter to the user or system administrator. Most filters operate by com-
puting a score s and by comparing that score to a threshold t, reporting spam if s > t
and ham if s ≤ t. Increasing t reduces hm and the expense of sm, and vice versa.
A Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve is the set of (hm, sm) pairs achiev-
able for any setting of t [62, 48, 125]. ROC was originally developed from signal detection
theory and is now standard in medical diagnostic testing. It can be said that if one filter’s
ROC curve is uniformly above another filter’s, the above filter will always outperform the
lower filter. If the curves intersect, the more appropriate filter may be determined by
examining the portion of the curve corresponding to deployment-specific requirements.
Kolcz and Alspector[73] displayed their results using an ROC curve which is shown in
figure 2.3.
Other curves have been used to display the trade off between ham misclassification
and spam misclassification. A recall-precision curve characterizes the set of all achievable
(sr, sp) pairs and hence is subject to the limitations we described for precision and recall.
Sahami et al[104] used a spam precision-recall curve in their evaluation; the curve is
shown in figure 2.2.
Martin et al.[84] suggest the use of a DET curve to measure filters within the context
of document understanding. The DET curve is a ROC curve plotted on a normal deviate
scale. The TREC Spam Track uses ROC curves plotted on a logit5 scale, which is similar.
On both scales, the curves tend to be linear.
The area under the ROC curve is a cumulative measure of the effectiveness of the filter
over all possible threshold values. ROC area (ROCA) has a probabilistic interpretation:
the probability that a random ham will receive a lower score than a random spam. ROC
area is not influenced by the deployment-specific parameter prev. Average precision (AP )
is the analog of ROCA for recall-precision curves.
As an alternative to ROCA, a summary measure may be computed by projecting the
ROC curve to a representative hm (or sm) value. sm@hm is defined to be the value of
sm such that (hm, sm) is on the ROC curve for some particular hm. sm@hm = 5%,
sm@hm = 1% and sm@hm = 0.1% have been reported [45, 130].
5logit(x) = log( x
1−x ); see Chapter 4.
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2.3.4 Test Apparatus
The objective of evaluating a spam filter is to measure its real life effectiveness. To achieve
this, one must create a test apparatus that simulates the filter’s operation. It is possible to
evaluate filters in real life though there are several variables that make the measurements
less accurate: variance in email, variance in users, variance in users’ interaction, and
variance in training, making the evaluation difficult to repeat. Though laboratory testing
must compromise the authenticity of the filter’s operation, it can control these variances
and is repeatable. Only once laboratory evaluation has shown a filter to be effective is
the expense of real-world testing justified.
The evaluation of learning filters dictates a test apparatus that incorporates training.
The classical test apparatus for learning includes batch training in which the classifier is
first given a set of training examples, and then required to filter a set of test examples.
The process involves splitting the evaluation corpus into training and test sets. A more
realistic apparatus incorporates on-line training. Studies using a batch apparatus are
shown in table 2.2, labeled lab-batch.
k-fold cross validation may be used to increase the effective size of a small evaluation
corpus [72]. A corpus of size n is divided randomly into k subsets of size nk where k is
often 10. k different pairs of test and training sets are created by using each subset once
as the test set with the remaining k−1 subsets combined for training. The average of the
k results has roughly the same statistical power as an experiment with training set size n ·
k−1
k and test set size n. The validity of this approach depends on the assumption that the
order of messages is unimportant[47]; that the ratio of ham to spam and the characteristics
of the ham and spam messages are invariant with time. Consider, for example, a burst
of five nearly identical spam messages that arrive in a short time interval. In a real email
sequence, the filter might easily be flummoxed by the first of these messages, but learn its
characteristics and correctly classify the rest. With ten-fold cross-valuation, it is nearly
certain that each training set will contain several of these messages, so the filter’s ability
to classify the first-of-a-kind is essentially untested. In general, cross-validation tests the
performance of a filter only after a fixed number of training examples; spam filter users
seldom have several hundred or thousand labeled examples available for training prior to
deployment. Studies using a ten fold method in table 2.2 are named lab-10 fold.
Modeling user feedback is substantially more challenging than assembling training
and test sets for batch evaluation. Many learning filters have an interface so the user can
correct misclassified emails. Some users update every misclassification while others never
correct the system. Even users that complete all updates do so at various times due to
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the nature of reading email. The user’s behaviour in updating the filter is a necessary
component in evaluating such on-line filters. No studies of the effect of user feedback on
filter effectiveness were found in the literature; one of the results in table 2.2 used an
on-line test apparatus, training the filter on randomly-ordered messages.
2.3.5 Test data
The test corpora available in 2004 (table 2.2) were limited in one or more of the following
ways:
• they contained private data, inaccessible to researchers for comparative studies;
• the messages were too few to yield adequate statistical power;
• the messages were sampled from non-representative sources;
• ham and spam were sampled from different sources;
• lossy transformations such as tokenization, feature selection, and header stripping
were performed;
• message contents were obfuscated to preserve privacy.
Table 2.4 describes the spam corpora reported as of 2004. Corpora labeled public are
available to be used for future studies; labeled private are available only to their propri-
etors.
Corpus # email # ham # spam availability source
Spambase 4601 2788 1813 public personal sample
Sahami et la. 1789 1538 251 private 1 yr recovered personal
SpamCop 1259 812 437 private personal sample
Drucker(AT&T) 3000 2150 850 private personal sample
Ling Spam 2412 1971 481 public mailing list & spam
PU1/PU2/PU3/PUA 5957 3508 2449 public personal
Filtron 6732 5109 1623 private 7 mth personal
Kolcz & Alspector 11408 6043 5365 private group & personal & spam
crm114 2374 856 1518 private personal
SpamAssassin 6034 4149 1885 public news groups, personal sample
Tuttle et la. 2800 1000 1800 private several personal sample
Holden1 1273 200 1073 private 1 mth personal
Table 2.4: Spam Corpora 2004
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• The first public spam test collection, Spambase[122], has been heavily used in the
Machine Learning research area. Each message is abstracted as a feature vector con-
taining 57 attributes representing word frequencies, and other email characteristics
such as number of capitals in the email. The text of the message is not available.
• Sahami et al[104] use a private corpus in which handcrafted features are extracted
from one year of personal email (1789 messages).
• The SpamCop private corpus [93] consists of 1259 personal email without headers.
• Drucker[45] collected 3000 private messages from one AT&T staff member. Emails
consisted of subject and body from which the 1000 best features were extracted.
• The public SpamAssassin corpus [120] is a collection of real email from multiple
users and news groups. It is widely used by practitioners but has also been used by
researchers. In 2004 it was the most realistic corpus available, albeit with certain
limitations. The ham and spam were drawn from different sources during different
time intervals. Some headers were redacted to preserve privacy.
• Ling Spam[2, 8] is an abstraction of 2412 ham messages from a mailing list and
481 spam messages from an individual recipient. We say abstraction because the
messages are stripped of headers and line breaks, converted to lower case, tokenized
and stemmed.
• Androutsopoulos et al.[2, 7] defines four public corpora – PU1, PU2, PU3 and PUA
– with a total of 5957 messages (3508 ham and 2449 spam); each corpus abstracts
and also obfuscates email from one recipient, so as to preserve privacy. In addition,
repeated spam messages and ham messages from regular correspondents – about
half the spam and eighty percent of the ham – are discarded in forming the corpus.
• The Filtron private corpus[88] consists of real email received by an individual over
seven months. During this interval, 5109 ham and 1623 spam messages were received
and classified. The messages have been abstracted into feature vectors.
• Kolcz and Alspector[73] assembled a private corpus of 11408 messages (6043 ham;
5365 spam) which were labeled according to category; each category was assigned
an estimated cost of misclassification. The corpus was split into training and test
sets in a 3:1 ratio. The messages have been abstracted into feature vectors.
• The CRM114 corpus is a private collection of personal email in original formatting.
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• Tuttle et al.[130] created a method to capture the email messages and judgements
using novel architecture that kept the data private. It then pushes tests to the users’
corpora that only return the filter statistics. Seven users with up to 800 messages
each were included in this study. The messages are abstracted into feature vectors.
• The Holden1[65] private corpus contains one month of personal email. The corpus
includes qualitative descriptions of the misclassified ham messages, observing a
preponderance of messages like welcome advertising, news clippings, mailing lists,
etc.
2.4 Creating a better Filter
The motivating for my research was not to study evaluation methodology for its own sake
but to create a better filter. Experience gained from combining IR systems[82] led me to
hypothesize that combining would also work for spam filtering. Combining the output
from multiple tools has been reported to improve information retrieval [90, 12, 116] and
classification performance [70, 14, 139, 77, 66]. In information retrieval, a primary concern
has been the combination of ranked lists of documents retrieved by different systems. The
combination of the results from differently structured queries has also been investigated
[13]. These techniques are generally applied to a batch process in which entire ranked
lists are combined. The on-line spam filtering approach resembles ranked retrieval in that
the spamminess score reported by the filter in effect ranks messages, but the ranking is
incremental as the scores must be determined one message at a time, without knowledge
of future messages.
Ensemble methods [43] have been the subject of much investigation for machine learn-
ing in general and for classification in particular. Bagging and boosting combine the
results of several weak classifiers, typically employing the same algorithm over perturbed
training sets or configuration parameters. Stacking [131], in contrast, uses a meta-learning
technique to induce the best combination of stronger classifiers that employ distinct meth-
ods. In general, these investigations have employed a batch learning configuration and
have been evaluated based on their binary classification effectiveness using separate train-
ing and test sets.
Neither näıve fusion nor stacking has been shown conclusively to have substantial
benefit in this application. Dzeroski and Zenko state with respect to general text clas-
sification, “Typically, much better performance is achieved by stacking as opposed to
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voting,” and “Our empirical evaluation of several recent stacking approaches shows they
perform comparably to the best of the individual classifiers selected by cross-validation,
but not better.”[46] Hull et al., within the context of batch filtering, state, “We have
found that simple averaging of probabilities or log odds ratios generates a significantly
better ranking of documents,” and “We generated [meta] parameter estimates using both
linear and logistic regression but failed to reach the standard set by the simple averaging
strategies.”[66] Sakkis et al. stack Näıve Bayes and k-nearest-neighbor (KNN) classifiers
using a KNN meta-classifier over various parameter configurations and observe that the
best stacking configuration outperforms the best individual classifier configurations by a
small margin:
The results presented here motivate further work in the same direction. In
particular, we are interested in combining more classifiers [...] Finally, it would
be interesting to compare the performance of stacked generalization to other
multi-classifier methods [...] .[105]
Segal et al. [113] employ a pipeline of purpose-built filters to analyze various aspects
of email messages. At the end of the pipeline, if no filter has definitively classified the
message, the scores from all filters are combined using linear coefficients computed by a
non-linear optimizer, the combination showing improvement over the individual filters.
2.5 The Next Steps
Chapter 3 considers on-line filter evaluation methodology and its application to real spam
filters and real email. Chapter 4 describes the TREC Spam Track, corpus creation, and
associated tools. Chapter 5 harnesses the toolkit to create a better filter. Chapter 6 casts
previous results in terms of standard measures and the major results that have been
achieved building on the tools and methods described here.
Chapter 3
A Study of On-line Supervised
Spam Filtering
A comparative evaluation of several commonly deployed open source spam filters was
conducted. The filters were evaluated using a complete sequence of one user’s email
from an eight month period. Our study advances the methodology, scale, realism and
repeatability of spam filter evaluation. Results from the study are an indicator of the
filters’ real world performance.
This approach is novel in that it closely models real filter usage, presenting to the filter
a large sequence of real email messages, one at a time in chronological order, for classifi-
cation. The same sequence of messages, under exactly the same conditions, is presented
to several filters for the purpose of comparative analysis. Measures are computed which
reflect a filter’s effectiveness. Statistical confidence intervals, which estimate the extent
to which the measured results might be due to chance, are computed for all measures.
An email corpus was created by capturing from the user a sequence of raw email
messages along with a ham or spam label for each message. Errors in the labels were
corrected using an iterative process to form a more accurate gold standard that was used
for evaluation.
The study also examines the kinds of misclassification filters make. Each misclassified
messages was labeled according genre (e.g. personal, advertising), and filter effectiveness
for each genre was measured. Change in filter effectiveness over time is also measured,
indicating the increasing difficulty of spam classification and improved filter effectiveness
with more training.
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3.1 Defining Spam
For the purpose of evaluating filters, Cormack and I[30] adopted the following definition
of spam:
“unsolicited, unwanted email that was sent indiscriminately, directly or indi-
rectly, by a sender having no current relationship with the recipient.”
Every message not fitting the definition was considered ham. Some illustrative examples
follow.
• Personal email from a friend. This email is ham.
• Advertisement for V I A G R A from unknown sender. This is spam.
• Chain letter from a friend. Chain letters are annoying and should be spam but this
email is neither indiscriminate nor from someone having no current relationship;
therefore, it is ham.
• Email from your bank advertising a new mutual fund. This may be unsolicited and
unwanted but, because of your prior relationship with the bank, the email is ham.
• Email from an unknown sender with a question about a project you worked on.
This email is unsolicited and you have no relationship with the sender but it has
not been sent indiscriminately so it is ham.
• A bulk email from an e-card organization you once used selling you on-line prescrip-
tion drugs. The email is unsolicited, unwanted and though you had a relationship
with the sender it is no longer current and is definitely outside the scope of that
relationship; therefore, the email is spam.
3.2 Study Design
Each filter configuration was tested in a laboratory environment simulating the usage
characterized by our model. In the interest of repeatability, we made two simplifying
assumptions. We assumed that no filter used time-varying external resources, so that
email messages captured at one time would be classified the same way later. We idealized
the recipient’s behaviour by assuming that he or she accurately and immediately reported
all misclassified messages to the filter.
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We captured all of the email received by one individual over a period of time. These
messages were presented, one at a time, in chronological order, to each filter for classifica-
tion. In addition, we extracted from each filter a spamminess score, indicating the filter’s
estimate of the likelihood that the classified message was spam. Immediately thereafter,
a gold standard classification for each message was reported to the filter. The filter’s
classification, the filter’s spamminess score, and the gold standard classification were
recorded for later analysis. Confidence intervals were computed for each measure, under
the assumption that the test email sequence sampled an infinite hypothetical population
of materially similar email.1
3.3 Evaluating Public Spam Filters
3.3.1 Evaluation Methodology
Each trial run is an idealized2 reproduction of X’s behaviour over the eight months in
which the email collection was originally delivered, with a different filter in place of
SpamAssassin 2.60. The subject filter is presented with each message, with original
headers, in the same order as originally delivered. Each filter was encapsulated using
three common interface procedures: filterinit, filtereval, and filtertrain. filterinit sets the
filter’s memory to a clean initial state; filtereval is given an email message and returns a
classification and a spamminess score; filtertrain is given an email message and the gold
standard classification. Some filters require that filtertrain be invoked for every message
(train on everything) while others require that filtertrain be invoked only for misclassified
messages (train on error). We used the method suggested by each filter’s documentation.
3.3.2 Subject Filters
We selected the current versions of six open-source filters whose deployment had been
widely reported on the internet and in the popular press. At the time of the study a
large number of classification techniques potentially relevant to spam filtering had been
reported in the literature, an extensive search of available practical email filters yielded
filters that used only a limited number of techniques, which we characterize as hand-coded
rule bases, internal or external black lists and white lists, and content-based ‘statistical’
1The notion of population has been the subject of historical and current philosophical debate[78]. We
adopt Fisher’s view [[49]] of an infinite hypothetical population.
2Idealized in that feedback to the filter is immediate and consistently accurate.
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or ‘Bayesian’ filters owing their heritage to Graham’s A Plan for Spam[56, 55] with
improvements due to Robinson[102, 101].
Of the filters we selected, SpamAssassin[121] is a hybrid system which includes hand-
coded spam-detection rules and a statistical learning component. The other filters –
Bogofilter[99], CRM114 [134], DSPAM[137], SpamBayes[94], and SpamProbe[20] – are
all ‘pure’ statistical learning systems, with only a few tacit rules such as those for tok-
enization.
Five different configurations of SpamAssassin were tested, in order to evaluate the
roles and interactions of its various components. These five configurations were compared
with one another, and with the in situ performance of SpamAssassin, which was deployed
when the email for the test corpus was collected.
SpamAssassin contains two principal components: a set of static ad hoc rules that
identify patterns associated with spam, and a Bayes filter fashioned from Graham’s and
Robinson’s proposals. Each ad hoc rule has a predetermined weight; the weights of
features observed in a particular message are summed to yield a combined spamminess
score. The Bayes filter, on the other hand, is adaptive – it uses statistics from previously-
classified messages to estimate the likelihood that a particular message is spam. This
likelihood estimate is converted to a (possibly negative) weight which is added to the ad
hoc spamminess score. The overall score is compared to a fixed threshold; the message
is classified as spam if the score exceeds the threshold.
We tested several configurations of SpamAssassin 2.63 so as to evaluate the relative
contributions of the ad hoc and Bayes components, and to evaluate various training
regimens for the Bayes filter.
Except as noted, the filters were installed using default threshold and tuning param-
eters. Prior training was not used; filterinit initialized the filter’s memory to the empty
state.
SA-Supervised. SpamAssassin 2.63 (both components) with the default threshold
value of 5.0.
SA-Nolearn. SpamAssassin 2.63 (ad hoc component only) with the default threshold
of 5.0.
SA-Bayes. SpamAssassin 2.63 (Bayes component only) with a threshold of 0.0.
SA-Standard. SpamAssassin 2.63 (Standard configuration with no user feedback) with
a threshold of 5.0. SpamAssassin is configured by default to be used in a situation, such
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as a mail server, where misclassification errors go unreported. To this end, it includes an
internal mechanism to train the Bayes component automatically, based on the spamminess
score rendered by the ad hoc component alone. filtertrain is never invoked.
SA-Unsupervised. SpamAssassin 2.63 (Unsupervised automated feedback.) filtertrain
is invoked after every message, but with SpamAssassin’s output classification rather than
the gold standard; that is, its own judgement is fed back to itself as if it were the gold
standard.
SA-Human. Real-world baseline. These are the initial classification results that we
captured from the memory of X’s SpamAssassin 2.60 configuration. As such, they rep-
resent the classifications rendered in situ by the spam filter, as amended in real time
in response to misclassification errors reported by X. These results show the combined
effectiveness of spam filter and recipient under real-world conditions.
CRM114 (version 20040328-Blame St. Patrick-auto.1). We trained the system only
after misclassifications, as suggested in the documentation. We did not use the whitelist
or blacklist facilities supplied with CRM114. Filter memory size was set at 10000001
buckets for both ham and spam.
DSPAM (version 2.8.3). DSPAM 2.8.3 self-trains on every message it classifies, and
annotates the message with a signature that contains information necessary for it to
reverse this self-training. We altered our test setup to supply this annotated message,
rather than the original, to filtertrain. We did not use the purge facility, which reduces
the size of the statistical table maintained by DSPAM.
Bogofilter (version 0.17.5). Bogofilter is a Bayes filter, like SpamAssassin’s, modeled
after the proposals by Graham and Robinson. Bogofilter emphasizes simplicity and speed.
SpamProbe (version 0.9h). A C++ Bayes filter inspired by Graham’s proposal.
SpamBayes (version 1.061). A Python Bayes filter inspired by the proposals of Gra-
ham and Robinson.
SA-Bayes. SpamAssassin 2.63 (Bayes component only). From the SpamAssassin
comparison group.
3.3.3 Measures
In this study, test several hypotheses are tested. For those that are amenable to statistical
inference we state confidence intervals and declare significant differences based on the
error probability α = 0.05.
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Receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis is used to evaluate the trade-off
between ham and spam misclassification probabilities. Using each of the numerical scores
returned by a given filter, we conduct a hypothetical run to determine the ham and
spam misclassification fractions that would have resulted had that score been used as
a threshold. The set of pairs (hm, 1-sm) resulting from the hypothetical runs define
a monotone non-decreasing function that is plotted as an ROC curve. As a summary
measure of the relationship between ham and spam misclassification fractions over all
possible thresholds, we present 1 − roca, where roca is the area under the ROC curve.
1 − roca estimates the probability that a random spam message is (incorrectly) given a
lower score than a random ham message. 1-roca estimates and 95% confidence intervals
were computed using SPSS 12. It should be noted that filters that do not train on
all messages would have to be run using a possible threshold to produce exact receiver
operating characteristic analysis. This is because changing the threshold would change
the messages the filter trained on. Due to computation constraints we only complete
the default run so the receiver operating characteristic analysis should be considered
estimates for these types of filters.
Logistic regression[5] is used to evaluate the effect of the number n of messages pro-
cessed on the probability P of ham or spam misclassification (i.e. the learning curve).
P and n are assumed to be related by the formula logit(P ) =def log( P1−P ) = α + nβ
(alternatively, P1−P = e
αenβ) for some α and β. Maximum likelihood estimates for α and
β, 95% confidence limits, and p-values (for the null hypothesis that β = 0) were computed
using SPSS 12. P1−P is the odds (as opposed to the probability) of misclassification; i.e.
the ratio of incorrect to correct classifications. eα is the initial odds when n = 0, and enβ
is the odds ratio; for every n messages the odds increase (or decrease) by a factor of enβ.
For small P, odds and probability are nearly equal, so we may consider enβ also to be the
risk ratio; for every n messages the probability of misclassification changes by this same
constant factor.
A piecewise graphical estimate of logit(P ) vs. n is juxtaposed with the logistic regres-
sion curve as a visual indicator of the appropriateness of the logistic model. Estimates of
initial and final misclassification rates, as well as the odds ratio, are tabulated with 95%
confidence limits.
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3.4 Test Corpus
We captured the email received by one individual (X) over an eight month period. These
49,086 messages were initially classified in real-time by SpamAssassin 2.60 [121] and
placed in X’s ham and spam files. X regularly examined both files and reported mis-
classification errors to SpamAssassin. X has had the same userid and domain name for
20 years; variants of X’s email address have appeared on the Web, and in newsgroups.
X has accounts on several machines which are forwarded to a common spool file, where
they are stored permanently in the order received.
X began using a spam filter when the proportion of spam in his email began to exceed
20%, causing X to overlook two important messages which arrived amongst bursts of
spam. Since then, X has used SpamAssassin 2.60 in a supervised configuration to classify
this incoming mail. It was necessary to modify SpamAssassin to incorporate this use,
as SpamAssassin was designed to be used primarily in an unsupervised configuration.
User feedback was facilitated by two macros added to X’s mail client. SpamAssassin
records every judgement (rendered automatically and amended to reflect user feedback)
in its learning database, so it was possible to recover our preliminary gold standard
judgements from this database.
The corpus created from X’s email will be referred to as the Mr X corpus.
3.4.1 Gold Standard Bootstrapping
Human adjudication is a necessary component of gold standard creation. Exhaustive
adjudication is tedious and error-prone; therefore we have created a novel bootstrap
method to improve both efficiency and accuracy[36]. The bootstrap method begins with
an initial gold standard G0. One or more filters is run using G0 for feedback. The
evaluation component reports all messages for which the filter and G0 disagree. Each
such message is re-adjudicated by the human and, where G0 is found to be wrong, it is
corrected. The result of all corrections is a new standard G1. This process is repeated to
form G2, and so on, until Gn = Gn+1. Often filters misclassify the same email; this email
does not need to be adjudicated during every iteration by the human.
Example of Gold Standard Bootstrap
Given a corpus with Email {E0, E1, E2 ,E3, E4, E5, E6, E7, E8, E9} we need gold
standard judgements: G={J0, J1, J2, J3, J4, J5, J6, J7, J8, J9} where Ji will be ham(H)
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Email E0 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9
G0 H S H S H S H S H S
Truth H H S H S S S H H S
Table 3.1: Example G0
or spam(S). We will test filters F1, F2 ,F3 against the corpus. To create the gold standard
we must first start with an initial bootstrap G0. Table 3.1 shows G0. For this example
every other email in G0 has been assigned as spam. The truth row in the table is the
actual classification for the corpus. It should be pointed out that truth can never be
known for a real corpus and the gold standard is an estimate of truth.
Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 shows the adjudication process. To start, each filter is run
using G0 for feedback. If any of the filter’s classification disagree with the G0 for a given
message, shown in bold, we adjudicated that message. Adjudications are completed by
a human reading the email. Disagreements, indicated in bold, are updated in the gold
standard. We then run the filters using the new gold standard, G1, for feedback. The
adjudication, update and re-run process continues until Gn = Gn+1. There are four
changes made from G0 to G1 . From G1 to G2 two changes are made. G3 is equal to G2
so the bootstrap process is stopped.
Email E0 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9
F1 H H H S S H H S H S
F2 H H S S S H H S H S
F3 H S S S H S H H H S
G0 H S H S H S H S H S
adjudicated H S S S H
G1 H H S S S S H H H S
Truth H H S H S S S H H S
Table 3.2: G1 Bootstrap Example
Email E0 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9
F1 H H S S S H H H S S
F2 H H S S S S S H H S
F3 H S S H S S H H H S
G1 H H S S S S H H H S
adjudicated H H S S H
G2 H H S H S S S H H S
Truth H H S H S S S H H S
Table 3.3: G2 Bootstrap Example
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Email E0 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9
F1 H H S S S S H H H S
F2 H H S S S S S H H S
F3 H S S H S S H H H S
G2 H H S H S S S H H S
adjudicated H H S
G3 H H S H S S S H H S
Truth H H S H S S S H H S
Table 3.4: G3 Bootstrap Example
Email E0 E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 E6 E7 E8 E9
G3 H H S H S S S H H S
Truth H H S H S S S H H S
# of adjudications 0 3 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 0
Table 3.5: Number of Adjudication
Table 3.5 details the number of adjudication for each email. E1 was adjudicated
3 times; adjudicating more than once can avoid human errors but experience indicates
additional times has little benefit. We tended to only adjudicate up to two times. In this
example 7 of the 10 email are adjudicated. This is much more than on a real corpus where
only 3 out of the 10 email adjudication in G0 were correct. A better G0 can be constructed
by using a non-learning filter or by judging a small number of email and using a learning
filter in a batch process. It is possible that the gold standard achieved in this process will
not be the same as truth. Consider if E9 truth was ham but all filters and all bootstrap
gold standard regard E9 as spam; during evaluation all filters would benefit by not having
this misclassification count against them. In real life this is unlikely to happen as filters
perform well and tend not to make the same errors. Though for accurate evaluation all
filters used in the evaluation should contribute to Gn and Gn+1. This constraint will
make the evaluation fair to all filters.
Mr X Gold Standard
For the Mr X corpus G0 consisted of the judgements rendered by SpamAssassin, amended
to correct all misclassification errors reported by X. G1 was created using SA-Supervised
with G0 as feedback. G2 was created using CRM114 and DSPAM. G3, G4 and G5were
created using all the filters but SA-Human as it wouldn’t make any sense to include.
It is important that all the filters were used in the bootstrap construction of G5, the
final gold standard has the net effect that every message reported as a ham or spam
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S → H H → S
G0 → G1 0 278
G1 → G2 4 83
G2 → G3 0 56
G3 → G4 10 15
G4 → G5 0 0
G0 → G5 8 421
G5 |H| = 9038 |S| = 40048
Table 3.6: Mr X Bootstrap Gold Standard Iterations
misclassification for any filter has been adjudicated by X.
Table: 3.6 show the revisions needed during the bootstrap process. S → H is the
number of messages revised from spam to ham. H → S is the opposite.
3.4.2 Genre Categorization
To facilitate further analysis, we categorized messages – both ham and spam – into
genres which may predict risk or cost of misclassification. For example, we suggest that
individually addressed messages and news digest messages, while both ham, may present
different levels of challenge to the filter and also different costs to the recipient, were
they to be lost. After the filter tests were complete, each misclassified ham message was
examined and assigned one of seven genres that we believed might be associated with the
likelihood of misclassification and the importance of the email to the recipient. We also
assigned a genre to each of a random sample (n = 352) of all incoming ham. Similarly, we
assigned one of five different genres to each spam message misclassified by one or more
of the four best-performing systems, and also to a random sample of spam messages
(n = 100) misclassified by each of the other systems. We also assigned a genre to each of
a random sample (n = 142) of all incoming spam.
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Initial Spam % Final Spam % Odds Ratio p
75.7 (75.0, 76.6) 86.6 (86.0, 87.1) 2.07 (2.04, 2.10) 0.00


























Figure 3.1: Spam Growth
3.4.3 Test Corpus Analysis
Table 3.7 summarizes the fraction of spam received by X as a function of the number
of messages received. Although the overall spam fraction is 81.6%, logistic regression
indicates that this fraction increased from 75.7% to 86.6% (an odds ratio of 2.0c7, p <
.001) over the eight months during which our email stream was collected. Figure 3.1
shows a piece-wise approximation of this function juxtaposed with the regression line.
3.5 Results
The test sequence contained 49,086 messages. Our gold standard classified 9,038 (18.4%)
as ham and 40,048 (81.6%) as spam. The gold standard was derived from X’s initial
judgements, amended to correct errors that were observed as the result of disagreements
between these judgements and the various runs.
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Filter Ham Misc.(%) Spam Misc.(%) Overall Misc.(%) 1-roca(%)
SA-Supervised 0.07 (0.02-0.14) 1.51 (1.39-1.63) 1.24 (1.15-1.35) 0.06 (0.04-0.07)
Bogofilter 0.08 (0.05-0.16) 6.63 (6.39-6.88) 5.43 (5.23-5.63) 0.08 (0.05-0.10)
SpamProbe 0.34 (0.23-0.49) 1.03 (0.93-1.14) 0.90 (0.82-0.99) 0.09 (0.05-0.13)
SA-Bayes 0.17 (0.09-0.27) 2.10 (1.96-2.24) 1.74 (1.63-1.86) 0.15 (0.11-0.18)
SpamBayes 0.17 (0.09-0.27) 5.86 (5.63-6.10) 4.81 (4.63-5.01) 0.16 (0.12-0.20)
SA-Nolearn 0.19 (0.11-0.30) 9.49 (9.21-9.78) 7.78 (7.54-8.02) 0.80 (0.74-0.86)
SA-Unsupervised 0.11 (0.05-0.20) 8.11 (7.84-8.38) 6.63 (6.41-6.86) 0.82 (0.76-0.88)
SA-Standard 0.07 (0.02-0.14) 7.49 (7.23-7.75) 6.12 (5.91-6.34) 1.00 (0.93-1.06)
DSPAM 1.28 (1.06-1.54) 1.98 (1.84-2.12) 1.85 (1.73-1.97) 1.03 (0.90-1.17)
CRM114 3.26 (2.91-3.65) 0.99 (0.90-1.09) 1.41 (1.31-1.52) 1.10 (0.94-1.27)
Table 3.8: Filter Misclassification
3.5.1 Filter Performance
Table 3.8 reports the performance of the filters. SA-Supervised misclassified 6 of 9,038
ham messages (0.07%) and 605 of 40,048 spam messages (1.51%). Overall, SA-Supervised
misclassified 611 of 49,086 messages (1.24%). The area above the ROC curve, is 0.9994
which we report as 1-roca (%) or 0.06. The SA-Supervised filter is a committee of two
distinct components: SA-Nolearn, a static rule-based filter, and SA-Bayes, a pure learn-
ing filter. Taken separately, each component shows inferior performance to the baseline
according to all four measures. We note in particular that SA-Supervised shows 2.5 times
fewer ham misclassifications than either SA-Bayes (p < .004) or SA-Nolearn (p < .035),
two-thirds as many spam misclassifications as SA-Bayes (p ≈ 0.000) and 6 times fewer
spam misclassifications than SA-Nolearn (p ≈ 0.000).
CRM114 has the best spam misclassification performance but it also has the worst
ham misclassification performance. DSPAM and CRM114 have significantly higher ham
misclassification rates than all the other filters show.
Using the overall performance measure of 1-roca, SA-Supervised, Bogofilter and Spam-
Probe are the top performing filters. SA-Bayes and SpamBayes overlap confidence inter-
vals with SpamProbe but are in the second tier. The rest of the filters have significantly
lower 1-roca numbers.
SA-Standard uses SpamAssassin’s default configuration: the same static and learn-
ing filter, but with the filter trained only on errors, as adjudicated by the difference in
results between the learning filter and a separate (more conservative) internal invocation
of the static filter. In contrast, SA-Unsupervised trains on every judgement returned by






































Figure 3.2: ROC Curves
intervention. As with SA-Supervised, both runs show fewer ham and spam misclassifi-
cations than either SA-Bayes or SA-Nolearn taken separately. Of the differences in ham
misclassifications only the difference between SA-Standard and SA-Nolearn may be inter-
preted as significant (p < .035). All differences in spam misclassification are significant
(p ≈ 0.000).
Figure 3.2 reports the ROC curves of the filters.
The ROC curves show that SA-Supervised, Bogofiler, and Spamprobe outperform the
other runs, performing better than SA-Bayes when ham misclassification is minimized and
as well when spam misclassification is minimized. SA-Supervised, Bogofilter, Spamprobe,
SA-Bayes and Spambayes all dominate the remaining runs. These runs, SA-Nolearn, SA-
Standard, SA-Unsupervised, dSPAM, and CRM114 show ROC curves that intersect many
times, indicating that their relative AUC scores are likely to be uninformative.
It appears that CRM114 filters the most spam having the lowest spam misclassification
rate but, when we look at the ROC curves, all the other filters could choose a threshold
to produce this spam misclassification rate that would greatly outperform CRM114 in
ham misclassification. All filters dominate DSPAM and CRM114 by substantial margins
at reasonable ham misclassification (less than 1%).
44 CHAPTER 3. A STUDY OF ON-LINE SUPERVISED SPAM FILTERING
Filter Initial Misc. (%) Final Misc. (%) Odds Ratio p
Bogofilter 0.19 (0.06, 0.62) 0.02 (0.00, 0.17) 0.08 (0.00, 1.98) 0.12
CRM114 4.53 (3.71, 5.52) 2.08 (1.56, 2.75) 0.45 (0.29, 0.69) 0.00
DSPAM 1.52 (1.09, 2.12) 1.03 (0.67, 1.58) 0.68 (0.35, 1.33) 0.26
SA-Bayes 0.31 (0.13, 0.72) 0.06 (0.02, 0.26) 0.21 (0.03, 1.52) 0.12
SA-Human 0.01 (0.00, 0.09) 0.45 (0.15, 1.38) 54 (2, 1222) 0.01
SA-Nolearn 0.32 (0.14, 0.71) 0.09 (0.02, 0.31) 0.27 (0.04, 1.72) 0.17
SA-Standard 0.38 (0.12, 1.19) 0.00 (0.00, 0.07) 0.00 (0.00, 0.40) 0.02
SA-Supervised 0.19 (0.06, 0.66) 0.01 (0.00, 0.15) 0.05 (0.00, 1.80) 0.10
SA-Unsupervised 0.39 (0.15, 0.98) 0.01 (0.00, 0.10) 0.02 (0.00, 0.47) 0.01
SpamBayes 0.23 (0.10, 0.58) 0.10 (0.03, 0.37) 0.44 (0.07, 2.96) 0.40
SpamProbe 0.96 (0.56, 1.65) 0.05 (0.01, 0.17) 0.05 (0.01, 0.26) 0.00
Table 3.9: Ham Learning Performance
Filter Initial Misc. (%) Final Misc. (%) Odds Ratio p
Bogofilter 7.95 (7.41, 8.53) 5.50 (5.10, 5.94) 0.68 (0.59, 0.77) 0.00
CRM114 1.90 (1.61, 2.24) 0.45 (0.35, 0.57) 0.23 (0.16, 0.33) 0.00
DSPAM 7.02 (6.33, 7.77) 0.23 (0.18, 0.30) 0.03 (0.02, 0.04) 0.00
SA-Bayes 2.51 (2.21, 2.85) 1.74 (1.52, 2.00) 0.69 (0.55, 0.87) 0.00
SA-Human 1.67 (1.40, 1.98) 0.64 (0.52, 0.79) 0.38 (0.27, 0.53) 0.00
SA-Nolearn 7.73 (7.25, 8.25) 11.37 (10.76, 12.02) 1.53 (1.37, 1.72) 0.00
SA-Standard 16.07 (15.22, 16.96) 2.67 (2.43, 2.92) 0.14 (0.13, 0.16) 0.00
SA-Supervised 1.68 (1.44, 1.96) 1.36 (1.16, 1.59) 0.81 (0.61, 1.07) 0.13
SA-Unsupervised 18.03 (17.13, 18.98) 2.67 (2.44, 2.92) 0.12 (0.11, 0.14) 0.00
SpamBayes 5.91 (5.46, 6.39) 5.82 (5.38, 6.29) 0.99 (0.85, 1.14) 0.82
SpamProbe 1.29 (1.08, 1.56) 0.81 (0.67, 1.00) 0.63 (0.45, 0.88) 0.01
Table 3.10: Spam Learning Performance
3.5.2 Effects of Learning on Filter Performance
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 summarize the ham and spam misclassification fractions as functions
of the number of messages processed. Each row estimates the initial misclassification
proportion, the final misclassification proportion, and the odds ratio between the two.
95% confidence limits and p-values are given for each. Figures 3.3 and 3.4 provide a
selection of the graphical representations of these functions; for all the learning curves
refer to Cormack and Lynam[31].
The learning filters show no apparent degradation in performance over the eight-
month interval. All learning filters show a reduction in both ham and spam misclassifi-
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Figure 3.3: Learning Curves 1
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Figure 3.4: Learning Curves 2
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significant. In particular, confidence intervals for the ham misclassification odds ratio are
very large, due to the fact that the curve is fitted to few points - of the order of ten for
the better-performing runs. Subject to this caveat, the plotted curves show a good fit be-
tween piece-wise approximation and logistic regression. Possible exceptions are DSPAM,
SA-Standard, and SA-Unsupervised. DSPAM’s spam misclassification curve, shown in
figure 3.4, has a piece-wise approximation that appears to be more concave than the
regression curve. SA-Standard (figure 3.3)and SA-Unsupervised (figure 3.4) both indi-
cate substantially lower spam misclassification rates prior to the virus-induced anomaly
at message 6,000, followed by consistent improvement notwithstanding the anomaly3 at
message 17,000. We observe that the initial misclassification fraction of a number of
systems is substantially better than the final misclassification fraction of others.
3.5.3 Human with Filter Performance
SA-Human uses essentially the same configuration as SA-Supervised, but the system was
supervised by X in real-time. That is, for every misclassification observed by X, the
system was retrained and the human-corrected classification was recorded as the result
for SA-Human. While SA-Human resulted in two more ham misclassifications than SA-
Supervised (i.e. 8 vs. 6) no significant difference can be inferred. SA-Human resulted in
two-thirds as many spam misclassifications (p ≈ 0.000). Table: 3.11 details SA-Humans
misclassification performance.
Filter Ham Misc.(%) Spam Misc.(%) Overall Misc.(%) 1-roca(%)
SA-Human 0.09 (0.04-0.18) 1.06 (0.97-1.17) 0.88 (0.80-0.97) -
Table 3.11: SA-Human Misclassification
We include SA-Human Learning analysis(tables: 3.9, 3.10 and figure: 3.5), as a real-
world foil to our laboratory results. SA-Human’s ham misclassification fraction shows a
large significant increase with a huge confidence interval (odds ratio 54(2, 1222)), indicat-
ing that this measurement is unstable, rather than that X suffered some degeneration in
discriminatory ability. Further investigation reveals that the positive odds ratio may be
accounted for entirely by three automated (but legitimate) messages received the same
day from the same source. SA-Human’s apparent decrease in spam misclassification may
also be accounted for by the anomalous spike at 17,000 messages.
3Due to backscatter, as defined in section 3.5.3
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Figure 3.5: SA-Human Learning
3.6 Misclassification by Genre
In the course of examining the misclassified messages, we identified several message genres
that we suspected might be associated with the filters’ performance.
Ham Misclassification Genres
1. Advertising. Messages from companies or organizations having a relationship with
the recipient.
2. Cold Call. Messages from individuals with whom X had no prior correspondence
or relationship.
3. Delivery. Messages from an email server pertaining to the delivery of an email
message.
4. List. Mailing list messages, broadly defined. This genre includes automated mailing
lists, service messages from mailing lists, and ad hoc messages consisting of general
information copied to a large number of recipients.
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5. News. News clipping and digest services to which X is subscribed.
6. Personal. Mail specifically addressed to X by an individual; the equivalent of first
class mail.
7. Transaction. Responses to electronic internet transactions, such as receipts, travel
itineraries, shipping information, passwords, acknowledgements, or status informa-
tion.
Table 3.12 shows the number of misclassified ham messages, by genre, for each filter. Also
shown is an estimate of the proportion of all ham represented by each genre. Four of the
runs have no personal misclassifications, a much lower fraction than would be suggested
by the fact that this genre comprises 51% of all ham. At the other end of the spectrum,
CRM114 misclassified 135 personal ham messages, or about 3% of all such messages.





































SA-Standard 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 6
SA-Super 1 0 0 1 1 0 3 6
Bogofilter 1 0 0 2 1 0 3 7
SA-Human 0 0 0 3 4 0 1 8
SA-Unsuper 5 0 0 1 0 1 3 10
SA-Bayes 1 0 0 4 1 1 8 15
SpamBayes 1 0 2 5 1 3 3 15
SA-Nolearn 1 0 4 0 3 9 0 17
SpamProbe 3 2 4 5 1 8 8 31
DSPAM 15 5 9 28 6 35 18 116
CRM114 7 15 13 78 10 135 37 295
Incoming Ham 0% 1% 17% 13% 14% 51% 4% 9038
Table 3.12: Ham Misclassification by Genre
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Spam Misclassification Genres
1. Advertising. Messages sent indiscriminately to X aimed at acquiring some or all of
X’s wealth.
2. Backscatter. Delivery messages from a third-party server, rejecting a message not
sent by X, but forged to appear to have been sent by X. These messages are deemed
to be spam (as opposed to Delivery ham messages) because they are a direct con-
sequence of spam.
3. Demographic. Advertising messages for goods and services of marginal value sent
to a specific demographic group to which X belongs.
4. Targeted. Messages addressed to X for no reason other than X’s membership in a
broad identifiable group (profession, geographic location, appearance on a subject-
related web-page, etc.).
5. Virus. Messages that contain malware.
In general, advertising, cold call, and delivery messages each represent a small proportion




























CRM114 72% 8% 12% 4% 4% 397
SA-Human 14% 66% 10% 7% 4% 413
Spamprobe 48% 17% 17% 7% 12% 421
SA-Super 28% 36% 22% 5% 9% 605
DSPAM 58% 8% 17% 3% 14% 791
SA-Bayes 45% 19% 17% 8% 11% 840
SpamBayes 50% 16% 25% 7% 2% 2348
Bogofilter 68% 14% 10% 2% 6% 2656
SA-Standard 17% 29% 5% 0% 49% 2999
SA-Unsupervised 9% 31% 7% 1% 52% 3246
SA-Nolearn 51% 24% 5% 0% 20% 3802
Incoming Spam 92% 1% 0% 0% 8% 40048
Table 3.13: Spam Misclassification by Genre
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messages represent disproportionately few misclassifications, while transaction, list, and
news fall in between.
Table 3.13 shows the estimated fraction of misclassified spam messages, by genre,
for each filter, as well as the fraction of all spam represented by each genre. The vast
majority of spam messages are advertising, with backscatter representing a mere 1%.
Yet nearly as many backscatter messages are misclassified. In particular, we note that
SA-Human and SA-Super misclassified a fraction of backscatter messages approaching
or exceeding 50%. Three-fifths of all of SA-Human’s misclassifications are attributable
to misclassified backscatter. The reason for this is that X was overwhelmed by the burst
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Figure 3.6: SA-Nolearn “Learning” Curve
In examining the “learning” performance of SA-Nolearn; as this system has no learn-
ing component, its performance may be used to gage any change in ‘difficulty’ of the
4X subsequently deployed an ad-hoc filter to identify backscatter messages and to record a judgement
automatically.
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spam messages over the eight months. Table 3.10 shows that SA-Nolearn’s spam misclas-
sification fraction increases from 7.73% to 11.37% (p < .001), indicating that the nature
of spam has changed so as to make it ‘more difficult.’ Figure 3.6 confirms this trend,
but also shows anomalous spikes in misclassifications centered at about 6,000 and 17,000
messages. SA-Nolearn’s ham misclassification fraction shows no significant slope over the
eight-month interval. In contrast, the learning filters show no apparent degradation.
3.8 Analysis
A Study of On-line Supervised Spam Filtering showed that supervised spam filters are
effective tools for attenuating spam. The best-performing filters reduced the volume of
incoming spam from about 150 messages per day to about 2 messages per day. The cor-
responding risk of mail loss, while minimal, is difficult to quantify. The best-performing
filters misclassified a handful of ham messages early in the test suite; none within the sec-
ond half (25,000 messages). A larger study will be necessary to distinguish the asymptotic
probability of ham misclassification from zero.
A supervised filter contributes significantly to the effectiveness of SpamAssassin’s
static component. The supervised filter alone performed better than the static rules alone,
but not as well as the combination of the two. This would indicate that by combining
filters, even better performance could be achieved. Chapter 5 will explore combining
filters in greater detail.
The choice of threshold parameters dominates the observed differences in performance
among the four filters (Bogofilter, SA-Bayes, SpamProbe, SpamBayes) implementing
methods derived from Graham’s and Robinson’s proposals. Each shows a different trade
off between ham accuracy and spam accuracy. ROC analysis shows that the differences
not accountable to threshold setting, if any, are small and observable only when the
ham misclassification probability is low (i.e. hm < 0.1%). The other filters (DSPAM,
CRM114) show lower performance over all threshold settings.
Ham and spam misclassification proportions should be reported separately. Accuracy,
weighted accuracy, overall misclassification and precision should be avoided as primary
evaluation measures as they are excessively influenced by threshold parameter settings
and the ham-spam ratio of incoming mail. ROC curves provide valuable insight into the
trade off between ham and spam accuracy. The area under the ROC curve provides a
meaningful overall effectiveness measure, but does not replace separate ham and spam
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misclassification estimates. Each case of ham misclassification should be examined to
ascertain its cause and potential impact.
In completing this study filterinit, filtereval and filtertrain had to be implemented for
each filter. This was both tedious and time consuming. A public evaluation tool with
a standard and well defined interface was needed. This insight was fundamental in the
development of the Spam Filtering Evaluation Tool Kit.
The study also showed that though the corpus had 9038 ham messages, several systems
misclassified less than 10 of these messages. Computing comparative statistical analysis
on numbers less than ten is very difficult. This indicated to us that a large evaluation
was needed and it should be completed over a variety of corpora both large and small.




To improve spam filtering one must be able to measure the improvement; standardized
evaluation can support this effort. Existing evaluation methodology was not sufficient
to allow comparisons. We have created a standardized evaluation, specifically the Spam
Filtering Evaluation Toolkit. The toolkit was created to provide a universal method for
running and evaluating arbitrary spam filters. It can be used with Windows or Linux. For
a filter to be evaluated by the toolkit, it must implement five command-line operations
(initialize, classify, train ham, train spam, finalize).
The toolkit requires a corpus to evaluate filters against. We have created several
corpora. The corpora are divided into two types: private and public. A private corpus
can only be used by the owner of the email. This means to use a private corpus the
owner must complete the evaluation for that corpus. A public corpus contains email
that anyone can read. Finding personal email that can be made public is a difficult
task but, due to a court injunction against the Enron corporation, a large amount of
email was made available. These email were used to construct the TREC 2005 Public
Spam Corpus.1 Creating a gold standard classification for these Enron email involved the
previously described iterative process as well as an extra step related to classifying another
person’s email. We show how quality of the corpus is improved with each iteration. We
also exploited the folder information in determining genre for the TREC public spam
corpora.
Both the toolkit and created corpora were used at the 2005 TREC spam filtering
track. Twelve groups and 53 filters participated in the spam track. Each of the filters
was submitted to TREC for evaluation. Groups both attended the TREC conference
1http://trec.nist.gov/data/spam.html
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and wrote papers detailing their filters’ methods. The results from TREC show learning
filters do an adequate job of filtering spam. It also shows they get better over time. The
TREC spam track was continued in 2006 and 2007 as well. Its methodology has been
used in other studies. The TREC spam track has provided an environment for creating
new and improved filtering methods.
4.1 TREC Spam Filtering Evaluation Toolkit
The TREC Spam Filtering Evaluation Toolkit is a standard testing framework that is
designed to model a spam filter’s usage as closely as possible, to measure quantities
that reflect the filter’s effectiveness for its intended purpose, and to yield repeatable (i.e.
controlled and statistically valid) results. The TREC Spam Filter Evaluation Toolkit
is free software that, given a corpus and a filter, automatically runs the filter on each
message in the corpus, compares the result to the gold standard for the corpus, and
reports effectiveness measures with 95% confidence limits.
4.1.1 The Need for Standardized Evaluation Methodology
Before this work there was a wide disparity of methods, claims, and measures employed.
These disparities made the determination of the performance of filter methods difficult.
As a result, it was very hard to make improvements and know, with any certainty, that
the improvements were actually better.
Much of the problem with disparities is related to two variants: firstly, the use of
different corpora; secondly, the diverse evaluation methodologies. We created a publicly
available toolkit so that research could not only use the same methodology but the same
corpora.
4.1.2 Toolkits required filter’s commands
The toolkit was created to provide a universal method for running and evaluating arbi-
trary spam filters. It can be used with Windows or Linux. Each filter must implement
the five command-line operations required by the toolkit:
• initialize – creates any files or servers necessary for the operation of the filter
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• classify message – returns ham/spam classification and spamminess score for mes-
sage
• train ham message – informs filter of correct (ham) classification for previously
classified message
• train spam message – informs filter of correct (spam) classification for previously
classified message
• finalize – removes any files or servers created by the filter.
4.1.3 Using the Toolkit
The toolkit takes as input a test corpus consisting of a set of email messages, one per file,
and an index file indicating the chronological sequence and gold standard judgements for
the messages. It calls on the filter to classify each message in turn, records the result, and
communicates the gold standard judgement to the filter before proceeding to the next
message.
The recorded results are post-processed by an evaluation component supplied with
the toolkit. This component computes statistics, confidence intervals, and graphs sum-
marizing the filter’s performance.
4.1.4 Toolkit Corpus Format
The toolkit requires corpora to be in a set format. Each email in the corpus is in a
separate file. The toolkit also requires an index file. Each line of the index file contains a
gold standard judgement followed by the location of corresponding email file. The order
of the index file is the order in which the emails will be fed to the toolkit.
4.1.5 Toolkit’s Test Corpus
We have reformatted the Spamassassin corpus to work with the toolkit to use as a test
corpus. The February 28, 2003 Spamassassin data set was used.2
2The files used in the toolkit’s test corpus are:
http://spamassassin.apache.org/publiccorpus/20030228 easy ham.tar.bz2
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The index file is a list of these email with judgements in arrival date order. The date
order was created using the Received: timestamp and, if this was not present, the Date:
field.







4.1.6 Computed Graphs and Measures
The toolkit calculates the following previously defined measures:
• Contingency Table (true positives, false positives, false negatives, true negatives)
• hm%, is the filter’s default threshold ham misclassification rate
• sm%, is the filter’s default threshold spam misclassification rate
• misc%, is the filter’s default threshold overall misclassification rate
• (1−ROCA)(%), is the area above the ROC curve as a percent
• sm%@hm% for various values of hm%
• hm%@sm% for various values of sm%
• logistic average misclassification rate, lam, a new summary measure
• Learning curve, initial and final values.
An example result file, bogofilter on spamassassin corpus, produced by the toolkit can
be seen in figure 4.1 with the ROC curve shown in figure 4.2 and the learning curve in
figure 4.3.
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1-ROCA%: 0.209005 (0.139822 - 0.312312)
<a href=graphs/bogo.roc.pdf>Graph of ROC Curve</a>
<a href=graphs/roc.pdf>Combined Graph of ROC Curves</a>
Logistic Averages
HAM%: 0.19 (0.10 - 0.39)
SPAM%: 23.93 (22.05 - 25.90)
LAM%: 2.41 (1.71 - 3.38)
LEARNING CURVE
HAM% Initial: 46.53 (10.62 - 86.44) Final: 3.6e-10 (0.00 - 0.00)
SPAM% Initial: 21.02 (18.43 - 23.87) Final: 31 (25.53 - 37.91)
LAM% Initial: 32.49 (15.05 - 56.65) Final: 0.00013 (0.00 - 0.06)
<a href=graphs/bogo.pdf>Graph of Learning Curve</a>
<a href=graphs/lam.pdf>Combined Graph of Learning Curves</a>
Figure 4.1: Example Toolkit Result File
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Figure 4.3: Example Toolkit Learning Curve
4.2. PUBLIC CORPUS CREATION 61
While (1−ROCA)(%) provides an amenable measure for filters that return a score,
some filters return only a categorical ham or spam result. For such classifiers, the single
pair (fpr, fnr) does not yield a meaningful ROC curve, so an alternate summary measure
is needed. It has been observed [52] that the diagnostic odds ratio, dor = (1−hm)·(1−sm)hm·sm is,
for many diagnostic tests, effectively invariant over a large number of threshold settings.
In terms of the logit-scaled ROC curve, constant dor appears as a linear curve with slope
1. The TREC 2005 results generally show this behaviour (e.g. figure 4.7)3, particularly for
the good filters. Intuitively, a change in threshold setting that increases the odds of mis-
classifying ham by some multiplicative factor tends to decrease the odds of misclassifying
spam by the same factor. Therefore dor is a useful summary measure largely uninfluenced
by threshold setting. In any event, there is no direct dependence on deployment-specific
parameters like prevalence and the consequences of spam and ham misclassification. In-
stead of dor we use logistic average misclassification rate, which is equivalent under a
monotone transform: LAM = logit−1( logit(fpr)+logit(fnr)2 ) = logit
−1(log(dor−0.5)). Note
that the value LAM is necessarily between hm and sm; when t is set to equalize error
rates, we have sm = hm = LAM .
Under the assumption that dor is invariant, it is possible to estimate (hm′, sm′) from
(hm, sm) by solving the equation
(1− hm) · (1− sm)
hm · sm
≈ (1− hm
′) · (1− sm′)
hm′ · sm′
.
It is further possible to estimate ROCA ≈
∫ 1
0 (sm) d (hm).
4.2 Public Corpus Creation
One of the most difficult aspects of evaluating spam filters is finding or creating a suitable
corpus. Because email is private in nature, no one wants their email available to the public
as a test corpus. Even if someone wanted to make their email public the privacy of senders
has to be considered. An alternative is to allow the corpus to remain private but the filters
must be all tested on the same private corpus. Several large private corpora were created
for TREC to measure the impact of corpus variation. As expected, the large corpora
provided higher levels of accuracy in determining filter performance.
Prior to this research, the SpamAssassin corpus[120] was the only publicly available
3The one filter that demonstrates a non-linear logit-ROC curve was found to have a serious bug. When
corrected its logit-ROC curve was also linear.
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collection of email in nearly raw form. Though the corpus was very useful and definitely
better than nothing it has some drawbacks. First, it is fairly small, making evaluation
statistics unreliable. Second, it contains email from news groups and is from multiple
users so it does not represent a natural email stream. Third, much of the header data
has been removed. Also, it has no real chronological order. Simply changing the order
the email are fed to the filter can greatly effect evaluated performance. Each of these
shortcomings compromises evaluation. A large public corpus was needed for three reasons:
to measure incremental improvements, provide usable evaluation statistics, and to vet
public evaluation results against private ones.
4.2.1 Email Collection
It is a simple matter to capture all the email delivered to a recipient or a set of recipients.
Using this captured email in a public corpus is not so simple. Few individuals are willing
to publish their email, because doing so would compromise their privacy and the privacy
of their correspondents. So we are left with the choice between using an artificial public
collection of messages and using a more realistic collection that must be kept private.
Artificial collections [120, 88, 6] may be created by using mailing list messages as
opposed to personal email, by selecting non-sensitive messages from a real email collection,
by mixing messages from diverse sources, or by obfuscating genuine messages.4 All of
these approaches conflict with our design criteria – that real filter usage be modeled
as closely as possible – and may compromise the very information that filters use to
discriminate ham from spam, either by removing pertinent details or by introducing
extraneous information that may aid or hinder the filter.
It is very hard to find real user email that is publicly available due to the privacy
concerns of capturing a stream of email and making it public. Fortunately, real email was
made public as part of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s (FERC) investigation
against the Enron Corporation. Over one million messages and files from 150 Enron
employees were released to the public.
The CMU Enron dataset [28, 71] contains around 500,000 of these emails with over
half being duplicates. The messages have been altered substantially, replacing the original
headers by synthetic ones and removing attachments. For these reasons, the CMU Enron
dataset was rejected as a source of messages.
4The majority of filters we have evaluated exhibit pathologies on the PU obfuscated corpora.
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Instead, we downloaded all public available Enron data directly from the FERC
servers. Though there were over a million messages, many of the messages were cal-
endar appointments and other non-email associated with email applications. There were
approximately 250,000 emails after removing duplicates. Of these some 100,000 have
headers; but only 43,000 have “Received:” line meaning the headers were mostly com-
plete. From these 43,000 messages, the TREC public spam corpus was created. The
FERC separated attachments from the email so extra steps had to be taken to re-attach
the files. The publicized Enron email were from 2001 and 2002. During this time the
percentage of spam was much lower. Of the 43,000 email, around 2,400 were spam.
The 43,000 Enron messages were augmented by approximately 50,000 spam messages
collected by Guenter in 2005.5 The headers of these messages were altered so as to appear
that they were delivered to the Enron mail server during the same time frame (summer
2001 through summer 2002). “To:” and “From:” headers, as well as the message bodies,
were altered to substitute the names and email addresses of Enron employees for those
of the original recipients. Spamassassin and Bogofilter were run on the corpora, and
their dictionaries examined, to identify artifacts that might identify these messages. A
handful were detected and removed; for example, incorrect use of daylight saving time,
and incorrect versions of server software in header information.
4.2.2 Public Corpus Gold Standard
In creating the TREC public corpus gold standard we employed the bootstrap method
described in the previous chapter.
G0 was constructed using SpamAssassin 2.63 with user feedback disabled. Subsequent
iterations used a number of filters – SpamAssassin, Bogofilter, Spamprobe and CRM-114,
interleaved with human assessments for all cases in which the filter disagreed with the
current gold standard. This process identified about 5% of the messages as spam.
It was problematic to adjudicate many messages because it was difficult to glean the
relationship between the sender and the receiver. In particular, the collection has a pre-
ponderance of sports betting pool announcements, stock market tips, and religious bulk
mail that was initially adjudicated as spam but later re-adjudicated as ham. Advertising
from vendors whose relationship with the recipient was tenuous presented an adjudication
challenge.
5www.em.ca/~bruceg
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During this process, the need arose to view the messages by sender; for example, once
the adjudicator decides that a particular sports pool is indeed by subscription, it is more
efficient and probably more accurate to adjudicate all messages from the same sender at
one time. Similarly, in determining whether or not a particular “newsletter” is spam, it is
desirable to identify all of its recipients. This observation occasioned the design and use
of a new tool for adjudication – one that allows the adjudicator to use full-text retrieval
to look for evidence and to ensure consistent judgements.
The adjudication tool exploited Mozilla Thunderbird message filters and GUI inter-
face. Adjudicating someone else’s email involves more detail than merely reading the
disputed email and determining if it is spam or not. To construct the TREC public
gold standard we start by creating the G0. As mentioned G0, was constructed using
SpamAssassin 2.63 with no user feedback. Next, SpamAssassin, Bogofilter, Spamprobe
and CRM-114 filters were run using G0 as feedback. To adjudicate G0 the corpus was








• each filter’s classification
• each filter’s score
The Gi header is the current gold standard bootstrap; the adjudicated header indicates
if the email has been adjudicated or not. The file location header is as detailed in the
index file. The combined classification is a combination of filters used; if any of the filters
considered the email spam, the combined classification did. The combined score was the
number of filters that classified the email as spam. The origin and folder headers come
from the data downloaded from FERC. The origin header indicates to the user where the
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Figure 4.4: Screen Capture during Adjudication
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email was found. The folder header was the name of the folder the email was found in.
In addition to these, every filter’s classification and score was added.
The email stream is then imported to Mozilla Thunderbird using popa3d[96]. Using
Thunderbird’s message filters, every adjudicated message is marked as read as well as its
spam status. All Gi and filter disagreements are flagged. In Thunderbird the columns
recipient, tag, and flag are added. To adjudicate an email the adjudicator marked it as
spam, or read and not spam for ham. Thunderbird is surprising quick at sorting email.
Sorting email allows for much greater consistency. For example, by sorting by sender it
became clear that some senders only sent spam. Also back when this corpus was collected,
spammers would send the same message to everyone so sorting by subject identified these
messages quickly and would find senders that could be sorted. Sorting on combined score
could identify email highly likely to be spam. This process would continue until all the
flagged email were adjudicated. As this point the collection would be sorted by spam and
read. The spam would be exported to a spam file. The “read but not spam” messages
would be exported to a ham file. The file location could then be easily extracted using
grep and the bootstrap gold standard could be updated. A separate adjudication was
also updated. This adjudication process was complete for each bootstrap iteration. A
screen capture of the G1 adjudication process can be seen in figure 4.4. During the screen
capture the email was sorted by sender showing the sender “InSync On-line” sent multiple
advertising messages to multiple users.
S → H H → S
G0 → G1 89 10
G1 → G2 134 546
G2 → G3 12 89
G3 → G4 0 59
G4 → G5 0 0
G0 → G4 132 601
G5 |H| = 41207 |S| = 2482
Table 4.1: TREC Public Corpus Bootstrap Gold Standard Iterations
Table: 4.1 shows the revisions needed during the bootstrap process. S → H is the
number of messages revised from spam to ham. H → S is the opposite.
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Figure 4.5: Ham Genre Histogram
Figure 4.6: Spam Genre Histogram
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Figure 4.5 shows a histogram of the folder labels for the ham emails. Figure 4.6 shows
a histogram of the folder labels for the spam emails. The folder labels can be used as
genre information much like the on-line study discussed in chapter 3. Folder labels were
used as extra information in adjudicating the messages. The personal label was quite
useful. The junk was not as useful a one might think. Often the junk folder contains joke
and non-useful email that would not fit our definition of spam.
4.3 TREC Spam Filtering Track
In 2005, Cormack and I founded and coordinated the TREC Spam Track. Researchers
were required to submit filters conforming to the toolkit interface for evaluation on private
corpora, as well as to run their filters on the public corpus and submit the results. 12
research groups participated in the 2005 Spam Track, testing a total of 53 filters. Details
of groups and filters are located in table 4.2. For comparison, revised versions of the open-
source filters supplied with the toolkit were run on the spam track corpora. The authors
of three – CRM-114, dbacl, and SpamBayes – were spam track participants. The authors
of the remaining five – Bogofilter, DSPAM, Popfile, SpamAssassin, and Spamprobe were
approached to suggest revisions or variants of their filters. These versions were tested in
the same manner as the participant runs. Table 4.3 illustrates each non-participant filter.
Group Filter Prefixes
Beijing University
of Posts and Telecommunications
kidSPAM1, kidSPAM2, kidSPAM3, kidSPAM4
Chinese Academy of Sciences (ICT) ICTSPAM1, ICTSPAM2, ICTSPAM3, ICTSPAM4
Dalhousie University dalSPAM1, dalSPAM2, dalSPAM3, dalSPAM4
IBM Research (Segal) 621SPAM1, 621SPAM2, 621SPAM3
Indiana University indSPAM1, indSPAM2, indSPAM3, indSPAM4
Jozef Stefan Institute ijsSPAM1, ijsSPAM2, ijsSPAM3, ijsSPAM4
Laird Breyer lbSPAM1, lbSPAM2, lbSPAM3, lbSPAM4
Massey University tamSPAM1, tamSPAM2, tamSPAM3, tamSPAM4
Mitsubishi Electric Research Labs (CRM-114) crmSPAM1, crmSPAM2, crmSPAM3, crmSPAM4
Pontificia Universidade Catolica
Do Rio Grande Do Sul
pucSPAM1, pucSPAM2, pucSPAM3
Universite Paris-Sud azeSPAM1, azeSPAM2
York University yorSPAM1, yorSPAM2, yorSPAM3, yorSPAM4
Table 4.2: Participant filters





SpamAssassin spamasasb, spamasasv, spamasasx
Spamprobe spamprobe
Table 4.3: Non-participant filters
Four primary corpora – three private and one public, detailed in table 4.4 – were used
to evaluate the filters:
Ham Spam Total
Mr X 9038 40048 49086
S B 6231 775 7006
T M 150685 19516 170201
trec05p-1/full 39399 52790 92189
Total 205353 113129 318482
Table 4.4: Corpus Statistics
• Private Corpus – Mr. X. The Mr. X corpus was created and defined in the
previous chapter. The iterative gold standard process of the corpus is sufficiently
accurate; systematic inspection of the 2004 results and of the 2005 spam track
results reveals no gold standard errors – any that may persist do not contribute
materially to the results.
• Private Corpus – S. B. The S. B. corpus consists of 7,006 messages (89% ham,
11% spam) received by an individual in 2005. This individual created the corpus
and ran the filters; track organizers had no access to the data. The majority of
all ham messages stems from 4 mailing lists (23%, 10%, 9%, and 6% of all ham
messages) and private messages received from 3 frequent correspondents (7%, 3%,
and 2%, respectively), while the vast majority of the spam messages (80%) are
traditional spam: viruses, phishing, pornography, and Viagra ads. Starting from a
manual preclassification of all emails, performed when each message arrived in the
mailbox, the gold standard was created by running at least one spam filter from each
participating group and manually reclassifying all messages for which at least one of
the filters disagreed with the preclassification. During this process, 95% of all spam
messages and 15% of all ham messages were manually re-adjudicated, and reclas-
sified as necessary. Genre classification was done using a mixture of email header
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pattern matching (for mailing lists and newsletters) and manual classification.
• Private Corpus – T. M. The T. M. corpus includes personal email, from all ac-
counts owned by an individual, including all mail received (except for spam filtered
out by gmail to the gmail address). The individual created the corpus and ran
the filters; track organizers had no access to the data. There are 170,201 messages
in total. Messages were manually classified as they arrived, and the classifications
were verified by running timcv.py over the corpus and manually examining all false
positives, false negatives and unsures until there were no more errors. Further ver-
ification was effected by running Bogofilter, SpamProbe, SpamBayes and CRM114
(in the TREC setup) over the corpus, manually examining all false positives and
false negatives. The corpus ranges from Tue, 30 Apr 2002 to Wed, 6 Apr 2005.
• Public Corpus – trec05p-1 In addition to the full public corpus, four subsets were
defined. These subsets use the same email collection and gold standard judgements,
but include only a subset of the index entries so as to reflect different proportions
of ham and spam. trec05p-1/spam50 contains all of the ham and 50% of the spam
from the full corpus; trec05p-1/spam25 contains all of the ham and 25% of the
spam. Similarly trec05p-1/ham50 contains all of the spam and 50% of the ham,
while trec05p-1/ham25 contains all of the spam and 25% of the ham. All subsets
were chosen at random. The numbers of ham and spam in each corpus are reported
in table: 4.5.
Ham Spam Total
trec05p-1/full 39399 52790 92189
trec05p-1/ham25 9751 52790 62541
trec05p-1/ham50 19586 52790 72376
trec05p-1/spam25 39399 13179 52578
trec05p-1/spam50 39399 26283 65682
Table 4.5: TREC05p-1 Public corpora
The subject filters were run separately on the various corpora. That is, each filter was
subject to (up to) nine test runs. The four full corpora – trec05p-1/full, mrx, sb, and
tm – provide the primary results for comparison. For each filter, an aggregate run was
created combining its results on the four corpora as if they were one. The evaluation
component of the toolkit was run on the aggregate results, consisting of 318,482 messages
in total – 113,129 spam and 205,253 ham. The summary results on the aggregate runs
provide a composite view of the performance on all corpora.


































Figure 4.7: TREC ROC Curves(Aggregate)
4.3.1 TREC Spam Filtering Results
Track guidelines prohibited filters from using network resources, and constrained tempo-
rary disk storage (1 GB), RAM (1 GB), and run-time (2 sec/message, amortized). These
constraints were not rigidly enforced and, in the case of run-time, exceeded by orders
of magnitude by some filters. Track guidelines indicated that the largest email sequence
would not exceed 100,000 messages. This limit was exceeded as well – the largest con-
sisted of 172,000 messages – but all filters appeared to be able to handle this size, given
sufficient time. All but two participant filters – tamSPAM3 and tamSPAM4, which took
22 days and 12 days respectively to process the 49,000-message Mr. X corpus – were not
run on all corpora.
Figure: 4.7 shows the ROC curves for the best eight participant runs ranked by (1-
ROCA)%, and restricted to one run (the best) per participant. ijsSPAM2 dominates the
other curves over most regions. However, if one considers the intercept with the 0.10%
ham misclassification line, crmSPAM2 is slightly (but not significantly) higher. This
difference is reflected in the different rankings shown in table 4.6. It may be argued that
this intercept accurately reflects the usefulness of the filter for its intended purpose. On
the other hand, a broad ROC curve may be argued to reflect good filtering performance.
Indeed, the crm group indicated that the falloff of the curve was due to a bug they






























































Figure 4.9: TREC Learning Curves(trec05p-1/full)
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ROCA ROCA Rank
Filters Agg full Mr.X S.B. T.M. Agg full Mr.X S.B. T.M.
ijsSPAM2 0.051 0.019 0.069 0.285 0.135 1 1 7 2 1
ijsSPAM1 0.054 0.021 0.069 0.372 0.155 2 2 7 3 2
ijsSPAM4 0.058 0.025 0.063 0.422 0.167 3 4 5 5 5
ijsSPAM3 0.064 0.022 0.050 0.475 0.181 4 3 2 6 6
crmSPAM2 0.115 0.122 0.051 1.888 0.166 5 14 3 16 4
crmSPAM3 0.116 0.042 0.177 0.231 0.195 6 7 14 1 7
crmSPAM4 0.128 0.049 0.218 0.393 0.272 7 10 15 4 8
lbSPAM2 0.132 0.037 0.083 0.835 0.411 8 5 9 9 11
lbSPAM1 0.136 0.039 0.103 0.778 0.443 9 6 12 8 13
tamSPAM1 0.172 0.164 0.138 1.892 0.294 10 16 13 17 9
spamprobe 0.173 0.059 0.097 2.039 0.445 11 11 10 19 14
tamSPAM2 0.209 0.178 0.349 1.127 0.416 12 18 17 11 12
bogofilter 0.210 0.048 0.045 1.426 0.792 13 9 1 13 21
spamasas-b 0.220 0.059 0.097 1.620 0.736 14 11 10 15 19
lbSPAM3 0.262 0.122 0.875 2.727 0.456 15 14 20 23 15
crmSPAM1 0.263 0.169 0.311 2.393 0.790 16 17 16 21 20
lbSPAM4 0.302 0.238 0.492 1.988 0.588 17 19 18 18 17
yorSPAM2 0.316 0.457 0.051 0.983 0.619 18 21 3 10 18
spamasas-x 0.380 0.345 0.065 0.558 1.123 19 20 6 7 23
kidSPAM1 0.768 1.463 1.274 3.553 0.530 20 28 25 29 16
dspam-toe 0.987 0.773 1.109 14.149 2.626 21 23 24 42 25
621SPAM1 1.008 0.044 2.616 2.389 0.161 22 8 35 20 3
621SPAM3 1.090 0.060 2.692 2.604 0.332 23 13 37 22 10
yorSPAM4 1.122 0.688 1.407 58.165 1.081 24 22 26 46 22
dspam-tum 1.274 0.827 0.997 19.384 3.700 25 24 23 43 35
dspam-teft 1.383 0.827 0.942 21.428 4.263 26 24 21 44 36
yorSPAM3 1.491 0.861 1.993 8.234 4.366 27 26 30 37 37
dalSPAM3 1.873 1.491 1.613 2.845 3.090 28 29 27 24 33
yorSPAM1 1.917 2.032 2.632 7.237 4.400 29 32 36 35 38
dalSPAM1 2.097 2.348 2.240 4.614 3.085 30 35 31 30 32
dalSPAM2 2.100 1.674 1.824 3.293 2.898 31 30 28 28 30
kidSPAM4 2.606 3.990 2.326 8.042 2.473 32 38 33 36 24
kidSPAM3 2.741 4.167 2.822 6.360 2.653 33 39 39 33 27
kidSPAM2 3.003 4.544 2.738 7.020 2.749 34 40 38 34 29
ICTSPAM2 3.048 2.643 0.943 3.110 8.298 35 36 22 26 41
dalSPAM4 3.115 1.370 4.282 9.002 6.294 36 27 43 38 40
indSPAM3 3.168 2.822 2.321 12.454 5.843 37 37 32 40 39
pucSPAM0 4.030 2.083 1.910 1.408 2.925 38 33 29 12 31
indSPAM1 4.302 5.346 2.471 13.507 8.382 39 42 34 41 42
pucSPAM1 5.746 2.185 3.081 1.585 2.712 40 34 40 14 28
621SPAM2 6.064 11.362 6.814 3.169 2.647 41 44 45 27 26
pucSPAM2 6.107 1.967 3.454 5.437 3.688 42 31 41 31 34
ICTSPAM1 15.115 4.659 0.748 3.023 34.208 43 41 19 25 43
ICTSPAM3 17.637 20.485 5.328 9.985 36.233 44 45 44 39 44
ICTSPAM4 33.879 10.952 4.114 6.112 42.893 45 43 42 32 46
azeSPAM1 34.079 28.887 34.048 44.502 39.082 46 46 46 45 45
Table 4.6: Summary Results
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trec05p-1/full trec05-1/full Rank
Filters hm% sm% ROCA h=.1 lam ROCA h=.1 lam
ijsSPAM2 0.230 0.950 0.019 1.780 0.470 1 1 2
ijsSPAM1 0.250 0.930 0.021 1.840 0.480 2 2 4
ijsSPAM3 0.260 0.970 0.022 1.840 0.510 3 2 5
ijsSPAM4 0.370 0.910 0.025 2.220 0.580 4 5 8
lbSPAM2 0.510 0.930 0.037 5.190 0.690 5 13 11
lbSPAM1 0.410 0.900 0.039 4.560 0.610 6 12 9
crmSPAM3 2.560 0.150 0.042 2.630 0.630 7 7 10
621SPAM1 2.380 0.200 0.044 3.630 0.690 8 10 11
bogofilter 0.010 10.470 0.048 3.410 0.300 9 9 1
crmSPAM4 0.910 0.250 0.049 1.960 0.470 10 4 2
spamasas-b 0.250 1.290 0.059 2.560 0.570 11 6 6
spamprobe 0.150 2.110 0.059 2.770 0.570 11 8 6
621SPAM3 3.140 0.170 0.060 7.020 0.730 13 15 16
crmSPAM2 0.620 0.870 0.122 4.520 0.730 14 11 16
lbSPAM3 0.830 1.050 0.122 22.380 0.940 14 20 18
tamSPAM1 0.260 4.100 0.164 6.920 1.050 16 14 22
crmSPAM1 1.840 1.650 0.169 10.530 1.740 17 18 26
tamSPAM2 0.850 1.450 0.178 27.380 1.110 18 22 23
tamSPAM3 0.220 4.460 0.183 7.640 1.010 19 17 20
lbSPAM4 0.910 3.870 0.238 22.940 1.890 20 21 28
popfile 0.920 1.260 0.325 7.350 0.940 21 16 18
spamasas-x 0.150 3.160 0.345 16.590 0.700 22 19 15
yorSPAM2 0.920 1.740 0.457 34.210 1.270 23 25 25
spamasas-v 0.060 39.510 0.516 31.310 1.870 24 24 27
yorSPAM4 2.990 1.360 0.688 84.920 2.020 25 38 29
dspam-toe 1.040 0.990 0.773 88.760 1.010 26 40 20
dspam-teft 0.260 1.790 0.827 47.090 0.690 27 29 11
dspam-tum 0.260 1.790 0.827 47.090 0.690 27 29 11
yorSPAM3 1.290 1.200 0.861 62.130 1.250 29 34 24
dalSPAM4 2.690 4.500 1.370 76.580 3.490 30 36 35
kidSPAM1 0.910 9.400 1.463 34.930 2.990 31 26 32
dalSPAM3 6.800 6.230 1.491 41.000 6.510 32 27 42
dalSPAM2 5.340 7.520 1.674 41.920 6.340 33 28 41
pucSPAM2 3.350 5.000 1.967 51.280 4.100 34 31 37
yorSPAM1 2.440 2.430 2.032 87.240 2.440 35 39 30
pucSPAM0 3.410 5.100 2.083 59.710 4.180 36 33 38
pucSPAM1 3.570 5.330 2.185 52.580 4.360 37 32 39
dalSPAM1 1.170 21.070 2.348 99.750 5.330 38 47 40
ICTSPAM2 8.330 8.030 2.643 79.510 8.180 39 37 44
indSPAM3 1.090 7.660 2.822 97.350 2.930 40 45 31
kidSPAM4 9.740 6.570 3.990 93.740 8.010 41 44 43
kidSPAM3 0.820 12.490 4.167 90.620 3.330 42 41 34
kidSPAM2 0.870 10.530 4.544 91.650 3.110 43 42 33
ICTSPAM1 5.690 20.850 4.659 72.260 11.190 44 35 46
indSPAM1 0.820 15.160 5.346 93.190 3.700 45 43 36
ICTSPAM4 8.180 24.890 10.952 98.440 14.660 46 46 47
621SPAM2 55.060 1.070 11.362 28.850 10.320 47 23 45
ICTSPAM3 14.100 28.220 20.485 99.390 20.260 48 48 48
azeSPAM1 64.84 4.57 28.887 99.50 22.92 49 49 49
Table 4.7: Public Corpus Summary Results
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discovered during the course of their TREC participation.
Figures 4.8 shows the ROC curve (logit scale) and figure 4.9 shows corresponding
learning curves for the top filters on the trec05p-1/full corpus. A system is considered
superior if its ROC curve is higher than another system at all points of the curve. The
curves appear to indicate that the filters have reached steady-state performance. Table:
4.6 shows the filters (1-ROCA)% on the aggregate, trec05-p1/full, Mr.X, S.B., and T.M.
corpora. The table also includes the rankings for these corpora. Values of (1-ROCA)%
vary a fair amount from one corpus to the next. However the rankings from one corpus
to the next don’t vary much with only a few exceptions in large changes in rankings.
Table: 4.7 shows the different summary measures to the trec-p1/full corpus. It also
includes corpus rankings based on the measures. It is interesting to see that the rankings
don’t change much for the different measures.
4.4 Discussion
TREC Spam Track evaluation presented here indicates that content-based spam filters
can be quite effective, but not a panacea. Misclassification rates are easily observable,
even with the smallest corpus of about 8,000 messages. The results call into question a
number of public claims both as to the effectiveness and ineffectiveness of “Bayesian” and
“statistical” spam filters. The filters did not, in general, appear to be seriously disadvan-
taged by the lack of an explicit training set. Their error rates converged quickly, and the
overall misclassification percentages were not dominated by early errors. In any event,
the use of a training set would have been inconsistent with the track objective of model-
ing real usage as closely as possible. TREC 2005 did not afford the filters on-line access
to external resources, such as black lists, name servers, and the like. Participants could
have included, but did not, archived versions of these resources with their submissions.
No aspect of the toolkit or evaluation measures precludes the use of on-line resources;
privacy and repeatability considerations excluded them at TREC. The efficacy of these
resources remains an open question, notwithstanding public claims in this regard. The
TREC public corpus has been made generally available, subject to a standard TREC us-
age agreement that proscribes disclosure of information that would compromise its utility




Fusion methods, under a variety of names[54], have been found to achieve varying degrees
of benefit for classification and ranked information retrieval applications. The toolkit’s
standardized filter interface allows for the easy examination of spam filter fusion methods.
It is revealed that a set of independently developed spam filters may be combined in simple
ways to provide substantially better filtering than any of the individual filters.
Pilot tests were conducted using the TREC Spam Filter Evaluation Tool Kit on the
eight open-source filters used in the on-line supervised spam filtering study. These tests
supported the primary hypothesis – that näıve fusion improves on the best base filter.
The pilot tests also indicated by exhaustive enumeration that subset selection or different
score-combining methods might provide further benefit.
After TREC 2005, tests were conducted using the output from 53 spam filters run
on four corpora within the context of the TREC 2005 Spam Evaluation Track. The 53
filters were developed by 17 independent organizations; the four corpora, totaling 318,482
messages, were derived from independent sources. The principal objective was to test the
primary hypothesis; a secondary objective was to examine the effectiveness of new fusion
and subset selection methods.
The combined results were evaluated, yielding more than a factor of two improvement
over the best filter. The simplest method – averaging the binary classifications returned
by the individual filters – yields a remarkably good result. A new method – averaging log-
odds estimates based on the scores returned by the individual filters – yields a somewhat
better result, and provides input to SVM- and logistic-regression-based stacking methods.
The stacking methods appear to provide further improvement, but only for very large
corpora. Of the stacking methods, logistic regression yields the better result.
77
78 CHAPTER 5. FILTER FUSION
Finally, this research demonstrates that it is possible to select prior small subsets of
the filters that, when combined, still outperform the best individual filter by a substantial
margin.
5.1 Overview Fusion
The variety among spam filter techniques is immense; from rule based and statistical to
distributed signature systems and many more. Even techniques with the same basic idea
differ greatly. One only has to look at the great differences in the performance among
the implementation of Graham’s Bayesian filter to see the variety. Some filters combine
multiple techniques to improve performance. The process of fusing these techniques
together is a technique in itself and there are many ways of achieving this. Another
option, the one I chose to take, is fusing multiple filters’ results together.
Using multiple filters creates some extra steps over using just one filter. First, the
incoming mail is sent to all the filters instead of just one. Next, an extra component
is needed to combine the different classifications from multiple filters into one overall
classification. There are several methods to combine the classification such as voting,
linear regression, SVM. Once the overall classification is complete, the filter process can
continue normally as if the overall classification is from a single filter. During training all
filters are trained.
5.2 Pilot Fusion Experiment
A pilot study was constructed to determine the viability of fusing multiple spam filter
systems. The Spam Filter Evaluation toolkit was utilized to quickly test eight common
filters. The baseline would be the best performing filter. Two different fusion methods
were employed. The first was a simple voting of the filters. The second made use of the
toolkit’s requirement that each email be given a spamminess score. Overall classification
was based on a näıve normalization of each filter’s scores on already seen email. Each
email was given an overall spamminess score, the sum of the normalized scores
5.2.1 Pilot Results










































































Figure 5.2: Pilot Fusion Filters vs. Base Filters(MrX Corpus)
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Figure 5.3: Subset Selection(SpamAssassin Corpus)


































Figure 5.4: Subset Selection(MrX Corpus)
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The pilot experiment investigated two näıve fusion methods – voting and normalized
score averaging – using eight open-source filters1 and two test corpora (n = 60342; n =
490863). Also investigated was the potential impact of subset selection by applying the
techniques to all 255 non-empty subsets of base filters.
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 show superior ROC curves for the two fusion methods, as compared
to all of the base filters. But only one curve, normalized score averaging on the larger
corpus, nets a significantly better (1-ROCA)% statistic (p < .02) than the best base filter.
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 shows (1-ROCA)% for normalized averaging over k-subsets of
the base runs, as a function of k. The curves labeled max, min, and mean are over the
(1-ROCA%) scores yielded by all subsets of size k. The curves labeled best and worst are
yielded by selecting post-hoc the base runs that, taken individually, yield the k best and
worst (1-ROCA)% statistics. The x symbols on the 1-axis indicate (1-ROCA)% for each
of the base runs.
5.2.2 Pilot Discussion
From the pilots, a conclusion was reached that the näıve combination methods were
worthy of further validation. Normalized averaging as a method for combining scores
relies on unwarranted assumptions about the distribution of spamminess scores returned
by the base filters. Therefore, a method was devised that relied only on the warranted
assumption that each filter would attempt to minimize (1-ROCA)%; that is, to minimize
the number of pairs of ham and spam messages in which the ham message yielded the
higher spamminess score.
K-subset analysis found reason to hypothesize that subsets of the base filters might be
found a priori (as opposed to a posteriori in the pilot) that would yield better performance,
or that would yield good performance with less computational expense. And if subsets










3Mr X Corpus [plg.uwaterloo.ca/˜gvcormac/mrx].
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5.3 Fusion methods
Best Filter
As a baseline for comparison, the filter achieving the best ROC score on each corpus
was selected (a posteriori).
Voting
Each base filter’s output consists of a binary classification and a spamminess score.
Vote fusion uses only the binary classification output of the base filters. The fused filter’s
spamminess score for a message is the fraction of base filters that classify it as spam –
a number between 0 and 1. The fused filter’s binary classification is determined relative
to some arbitrary constant threshold 0 < t < 1; a spam classification is returned when
spamminess > t. The summary statistics presented are insensitive to our choice of
t = 0.5.
Log-odds averaging
When a filter reports a spamminess score sn for the nth message, the estimate Ln, is
the odds that the message is spam to be
Ln = log
| {i < n | si ≤ sn and ithmessage is spam} | + ε
| {i < n | si ≥ sn and ithmessage is ham} | + ε
.
That is, simply count the number of prior spam messages with a lower or equal score
and the number of prior non-spam messages with a higher or equal score, and take the log
of their ratio. The necessary counting can be done in O(log n) time with a suitable data
structure [15]. The fused spamminess score is the arithmetic mean of the base filters’ Ln
scores. With t = 0.
SVM
Li scores were used as features and all prior messages were used as a training set.
SVMlight’s [67] default kernel and parameters were used. For efficiency reasons, SVMlight
was not run after every message; retraining was effected at exponential-like intervals.4
The SVMlight output was used directly as the fused spamminess score. With t = 0.
4Increasing training set sizes were used to adapt SVM, a batch method, to on-line classification [35].
Training set sizes of 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 500, 1000, 2000, 5000, 10000, 20000,
50000 are used.
5.4. FUSION RESULTS 83
Logistic regression
The LR-TRIRLS logistic regression package [76] was used to find weights such that
the weighted average of the base filters’ Li scores best predicted the log-odds of the clas-
sification of prior messages. This weighted average was used as the spamminess score,
and t = 0. Negative weights were assumed to represent over-fitting; an iterative process
was used to eliminate them. The filter with the most negative weight was eliminated; re-
gression and elimination were repeated until no negative weights remained. For efficiency
reasons, the weights were not recomputed for every message. For the first 100 messages,
the weights were fixed at 1f , where f is the number of base filters. Thereafter, they were
recomputed after every nj messages where n1, n2, n3, ... forms a exponential-like series.5
5.4 Fusion Results
Figures 5.5, 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 show the ROC curves for the four fusion methods and the best
filter for each of the four corpora. Table 5.1 shows the summary statistics for the same
runs, with 95% confidence limits and p-values. Each p-value indicates the probability
that the statistic’s improvement over that of the best filter may be due to chance.
All fusion methods substantially outperformed the best filter. The lack of significance
of results with respect to the S.B. corpus may be attributed to its size; 775 spam messages
are insufficient to distinguish filters at the error rates achieved. It may also be the case
that some effects (notably SVM and logistic-regression stacking) increase with corpus size.
Voting – simply counting the binary classification outputs of the filters – is remarkably
effective, but appears to yield somewhat less improvement than the other filters. On
the other hand, there is reason to believe that voting is more stable, and may perform
better on short corpora, or on the first several thousand messages of long corpora. One
possible reason for this is that voting is better able to take advantage of prior knowledge
incorporated into the individual filters; until reliable estimates of the filter’s credibility
are obtained, simple voting seems to be the safest choice. Nevertheless, given the diversity
of performance among the base filters, it is remarkable that a simple vote works so well.
Each filter, no doubt, incorporates several arbitrary parameters set by its authors, not
the least important of which is t, the classification threshold. Thus, voting works well
due to social behaviour as much as any technical reason.
5Increasing training set sizes of 0, 100, 200, 300, 400, 500, 600, 700, 800, 900, 1000, 1100, 2100,
4100, 9100, 19100, 39100, 69100, 99100, 129100, 159100 is used
































































Figure 5.6: Fusion Filters vs. Best Filter(SB Corpus)
































































Figure 5.8: Fusion Filters vs. Best Filter(Full Corpus)
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Method (1−ROCA)% sm%@hm% = .1
logistic .007*** (.005-.008) .73*** (.55-.98)
svm .008*** (.005-.013) .65*** (.55-.77)
logodds .009*** (.007-.011) .80*** (.65-.98)
vote .013* (.010-.018) 1.00*** (.82-1.21)
best .019 (.015-.023) 1.78 (1.42-2.22)
Method (1−ROCA)% sm%@hm% = .1
logistic .010*** (.007-.014) 1.32* (.68-2.58)
logodds .011*** (.007-.016) 1.02** (.53-1.97)
svm .011*** (.007-.017) 1.48* (.73-2.98)
vote .014*** (.008-.024) 1.21** (.86-1.71)
best .045 (.032-.063) 3.90 (1.55-9.50)
Full Corpus Mr X Corpus
Method (1−ROCA)% sm%@hm% = .1
vote .115** (.071-.184) 10.5 (6.75-15.8)
svm .155 (.046-.516) 6.71 (3.66-12.0)
logistic .166 (.057-.483) 5.55 (3.57-8.53)
logodds .193 (.076-.490) 11.0 (7.01-16.8)
best .231 (.142-.377) 11.2 (4.38-25.9)
Method (1−ROCA)% sm%@hm% = .1
logistic .036*** (.030-.044) 3.89*** (3.43-4.41)
svm .055*** (.045-.067) 3.97*** (3.50-4.49)
logodds .061*** (.045-.067) 4.78*** (4.27-5.33)
vote .095** (.079-.115) 4.91*** (4.45-5.43)
best .135 (.111-.163) 10.3 (9.16-11.6)
S B Corpus T M Corpus
Method (1−ROCA)% sm%@hm% = .1
logistic .012*** (.010-.015) 1.20*** (1.07-1.35)
svm .017*** (.015-.021) 1.29*** (1.16-1.45)
logodds .020*** (.017-.023) 1.78*** (1.64-1.93)
vote .028*** (.023-.033) 1.66*** (1.48-1.86)
best .051 (.044-.058) 3.78 (3.36-4.25)
Aggregate Results
improvement on best: *p < .05, **p < .005, ***p < .0005
Table 5.1: Fusion Summary Statistics
The log-odds transformation is an essential component of the other techniques – the
transformed scores were used directly and also as input to the SVM and logistic regression
meta-learning methods. In the pilot experiment, various linear and non-linear combina-
tions of scores were investigated. Although the sum of linear-normalized scores worked
acceptably well in the pilot, there was no confidence that it would combine well the di-
verse score distributions found in the TREC runs. Indeed it did not, performing more
poorly than simple voting on the Mr X Corpus. Therefore it was dropped from further
consideration and was not tested on the other corpora. Since Mr X was used in the
pilot (but with different filters), it was used for testing various parameters and methods,
testing only the ones that appeared promising – the ones reported here – on the other
corpora. In this sense one may consider the Mr X results to be somewhat “cherry picked”
but not the results on the other corpora.
The rationale for the log-odds transformation is as follows. Given a threshold t,
messages may be placed in two dichotomous classes: spam messages with spamminess
score s ≤ t, and non-spam messages with s ≥ t. A new message with spamminess t must
necessarily fall into one of these classes. The observed size of these classes was used as
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an estimate of the odds ratio. That is, the area of the tails of the unnormalized score
distribution provides a likelihood ratio multiplied by the prior odds (i.e. the overall odds
ratio). Using log-likelihood instead of log-odds was also experimented. Log-likelihood is
computed by subtracting log-prior-odds from log-odds; log-prior-odds is easily estimated
from the observed spam to non-spam ratio. While log-likelihood makes more “sense” from
a probabilistic point of view, it makes no difference to ROC or logistic regression results,
and introduces slightly more noise due to the (additional) instability of the log-prior-odds
estimate. In addition, positive or negative log likelihood ratios [10] were computed (as
appropriate) from the base filters’ binary classifications; preliminary testing revealed the
average of these works marginally better than voting, but not as well as the average of
the log-odds-transformed scores.
Three of the corpora showed better results for log-odds averaging than for voting; two
were significant in a 2-tailed test (full, p < .0002; mrx, p < .2; tm, p < .0001), one showed
an inferior (sb, p < .16) result which is largely due to chance, but may also be due to
the small size of the corpus offering insufficient numbers for accurate log-odds estimates.
The aggregate “run”, which is not a run at all but an amalgam of the other four, shows
that log-odds averaging improves on voting (p < .0001).
The log-odds transformed scores were used as input features to SVMlight. The un-
transformed scores and the binary classifications as features were also tried with delete-
rious results. We also tried several combinations of kernels and parameter settings, but
found none that yielded better results. We do not claim to have the exhausted space of
features, kernels and settings. SVMlight, using default parameters, improves on voting on
the same corpora as does log-odds, and shows a significant improvement in the aggregate
(p < .0001). While SVM’s improvement over log-odds is significant only for the aggregate
run (p < .01), the consistent improvement over the four corpora leads us to believe that
it is better.
Straightforward logistic regression yielded poor performance, even with very large
amounts of training data. We observed, as did Hull [66] in a somewhat different context,
that negative coefficients were a near-certain sign of over-fitting.6 But logistic regression
constrained to non-negative results is intractable, so we used the simple heuristic of delet-
ing the filter with the most negative coefficient and repeating until no negative coefficients
remained. There is no reason to believe that this is the best approach. For example, we
could have used significance rather than magnitude as an elimination criterion. But for
6We say near-certain because the process did, in fact, discover some valid negative coefficients. Two of
the base filters were fusions of other filters, and the regression process yielded a strong negative coefficient
for components that were overrepresented.
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efficiency we chose a simplistic technique that appeared to work. We leave it to future
research to investigate more sophisticated strategies.
Logistic regression performed the best on all corpora except S. B.; significantly better
than the other methods in the aggregate (vote, p < .0001 ; logodds, p < .0001 ; svm, p <
.0001). S. B.’s discordant result is not significant and may be due to chance. Examination
of the ROC curve (figure 5.1) shows the logistic regression curve apparently superior to
the rest, yet the (1-ROCA)% statistic is inferior. Further investigation, and verification
of the ROC results with SPSS, shows that an extreme point beyond the scale of the
graph accounts for the difference. We note also that sm% at hm% = .1 shows logistic
regression to be superior on the S. B. corpus. While the difference may be due to chance,
it is also plausible that stacking methods are superior only on larger corpora, where they
have more opportunity to learn.
5.5 Predicting Subset Experiment
To select subsets of the base filters, we employed the same elimination process as logistic-
regression stacking. After eliminating the filters corresponding to negative weights, we
continued the process – eliminating the filter with the smallest weight – until only k filters
remained. These k filters formed the base classifiers for a new fused filter. The resulting
filter combines k spamminess scores by multiplying them by their respective weights as
determined by the selection process. The subset experiment, unlike fusion, involved a
batch process – selection and the computation of weights takes place with respect to a
training corpus and the resulting filter is applied to a different test corpus.
To evaluate the subset selection method, we used two corpora – Mr X and S B – as
training corpora, and the other two – Full and T M – as test corpora. For each test corpus
we computed subsets of size 2, 3, 4, 8, 16, ..., m where m is the largest subset that yields
all positive coefficients. Each subset was used in a fusion run on the two test corpora.
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 show the results of these four sets of runs. All subsets improve on the
best run in both measures, significantly so except for the smaller subsets trained on the
S.B. corpus. Performance improves with subset size; performance of the larger subsets is
comparable to that of the better fusion methods.
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Subset (1−ROCA)% sm%@hm% = .1
sb14 .008*** (.007-.010) 1.01*** (.81-1.25)
sb8 .008*** (.007-.010) 1.02*** (.81-1.28)
sb4 .010*** (.008-.012) 1.40* (1.07-1.82)
sb3 .012*** (.010-.015) 1.45* (1.22-1.73)
sb2 .015*** (.012-.018) 1.51 (1.23-1.84)
best .019 (.015-.023) 1.78 (1.42-2.22)
Subset (1−ROCA)% sm%@hm% = .1
sb14 .049*** (.041-.059) 5.50*** (4.83-6.27)
sb8 .053*** (.044-.063) 5.78*** (5.01-6.66)
sb4 .058*** (.048-.069) 6.09*** (5.21-7.11)
sb3 .074*** (.061-.089) 7.72*** (6.60-9.00)
sb2 .109** (.087-.136) 8.80*** (7.58-10.18)
best .135 (.111-.163) 10.3 (9.16-11.6)
Full Corpus T M Corpus
improvement on best: *p < .05, **p < .005, ***p < .0005
Table 5.2: SB-derived Subsets on Full and TM Corpora
Subset (1−ROCA)% sm%@hm% = .1
mrx23 .007*** (.006-.009) .79*** (.62-.99)
mrx16 .007*** (.006-.009) .84*** (.69-1.02)
mrx8 .009*** (.007-.011) .88*** (.71-1.08)
mrx4 .012*** (.009-.015) 1.07*** (.82-1.39)
mrx3 .012*** (.010-.016) 1.15*** (.92-1.44)
mrx2 .016 (.012-.021) 1.31** (1.01-1.68)
best .019 (.015-.023) 1.78 (1.42-2.22)
Subset (1−ROCA)% sm%@hm% = .1
mrx23 .047*** (.038-.057) 3.84*** (3.41-4.32)
mrx16 .050*** (.040-.062) 3.99*** (3.56-4.48)
mrx8 .055*** (.041-.072) 4.22*** (3.72-4.79)
mrx4 .084*** (.067-.105) 4.37*** (3.74-5.09)
mrx3 .081*** (.063-.104) 4.20*** (3.66-4.81)
mrx2 .094*** (.075-.118) 4.40*** (3.90-4.96)
best .135 (.111-.163) 10.3 (9.16-11.6)
Full Corpus T M Corpus
improvement on best: *p < .05, **p < .005, ***p < .0005
Table 5.3: Mr X-derived Subsets on Full and TM Corpora
The stepwise elimination process embodied in the logistic regression approach identi-
fies a subset of the base filters that contribute to the best fusion result. Continuing the
elimination process yields smaller subsets which all outperform the best filter; even the
subsets of size 2 outperform the best individual filter. Figure 5.9 indicates the number of
distinct Mr X-derived subsets in which each filter participates; the filters are labeled and
ordered by their individual performances. We note that the best-performing filter is not a
member of any of the subsets – many strong filters are excluded in favour of weaker ones.
The S B derived subsets show the same effect, from which we may infer that inter-filter
correlation is a determining factor in subset selection.
The cross-corpus design of the experiments serves to indicate that a subset of filters
chosen using one source of email may be expected to yield a fused filter that works well
on another.
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Figure 5.9: Base Filter Participation in Subsets (by Separate Performance)
5.6 Discussion
The potential contribution of machine learning techniques to real spam filtering is as-yet
unresolved. In artificial environments they appear to be promising, but this promise is
yet to be demonstrated in comparison to existing filters[35]. The potential contribution
of real-time network resources and collaborative methods to spam filtering also has yet
to be established. Spam filtering is an adversarial task – the degree to which spam is
able to adapt to counter advances in filtering has yet to be studied. While constructing
controlled experiments to measure these factors presents a significant logistical challenge,
our model and evaluation methods are amenable.
The simplest fusion method – voting based on the binary classifications yielded by
the individual filters – yields an ROC curve that is clearly superior to the best filter on
each of the corpora. Although voting works well, it lacks appeal because it relies on the
arbitrarily-set classification thresholds of the individual filters, and its sensitivity can be
adjusted only coarsely by specifying the number of filters that must agree to classify a
message as spam. The 53 different threshold values afforded by this test were adequate
to achieve good ROC results, but we are skeptical as to whether the approach would
be practical for a smaller number of filters, unless one had the capability to adjust the
individual filters’ thresholds.
The score-based fusion methods – log-odds averaging, SVM, and logistic regression
5.6. DISCUSSION 91
– are more appealing in that they use the score and not the threshold setting from
each individual filter. The score-based methods also appear to improve on voting, but
the incremental improvement is not nearly as dramatic as that of voting over the best
individual filter. The ROC curves for these methods don’t clearly dominate voting, and
the statistics are superior by a significant margin on only the larger corpora. Of these
methods, logistic regression (with elimination of filters with negative coefficients) appears
to yield the best performance. On the other hand, log-odds averaging is the simplest of
the score-based methods, and the other methods take as input the log-odds transformed
scores. That is, the log-odds transformation is the essential basis of all the score-based
methods. Because SVM and logistic regression are batch oriented, increasing exponential-
like training sizes were required to make the effort tolerable while still being reasonably
adaptive. After this work was completed; on-line methods for both logistic regression and
SVM have been developed, and they work as well as the batch methods we employed.
In practice, it may not be feasible to run 53 separate filters on each incoming email
message. Our experiments indicate that it is possible to select a smaller number – roughly
half – without compromising performance. Smaller subsets – perhaps only a handful of
filters – compromise performance only slightly. Furthermore, it appears that these subsets
may be picked prior, based on a training corpus derived from a distinct source of email.
Fusion experiments may be repeated using the public corpora and the open-source
filters. The 53 filters tested at TREC include the best available filters at the time as well
as several experimental and less-well-performing filters. We advanced the hypothesis that
as new filters were developed and tested, they too would perform best in combination with
other independently-developed filters. This hypothesis is supported by later experiments





• reported results of studies evaluating spam filter effectiveness, recast where possible
in terms of hm, sm and ROCA;
• datasets, tools, and evaluation methodologies;
• progress in spam filtering catalyzed by this work.
The primary focus of this chapter is the evaluation of on-line content filters; that is, filters
that use only the content of the messages, along with feedback derived from the user in
the course of reading email. Within this context we consider also batch-oriented content
filters, but not system-wide approaches.
6.1 Recasting Previous Studies with Standard Measures
Direct comparison of results demands that common data (or at least data sampled from
a similar population) be used to test different filters, or that common filters be tested
on different data, and that common measures be reported. Valid measurements must be
based on realistic assumptions and statistically well founded. With these criteria in mind,
we explore the commonality among studies, and, where possible from the published data,
recast their results in terms of common measures with confidence intervals.
Sahami et al. [104] conducted an early study that indicated the utility of Bayesian
classifiers for spam filtering. One experiment used a corpus of 1789 actual email mes-
sages (11.8% ham; 88.2% spam), split chronologically into 1538 training messages and
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1.7% (0.3%-4.9%) 20% (9.6%-34.6%) 5.41 (2.82-9.25)
Table 6.1: Sahami et al. Results
251 test messages. Both ham and spam precision/recall curves were calculated. The
best-performing system achieved ham recall of 100% and spam recall of 98.3%. From
these values and the test sample size we may compute hm = 0% (0% − 9.5%) and
sm = 1.7% (0.4% − 4.6%). A second experiment classified the spam component of a
similar corpus into two genres: pornographic and non-pornographic. The genres were
used in an evaluation of ternary classification, but not for a stratified evaluation of bi-
nary classification. A third experiment most closely resembles those which we conducted:
an individual’s email messages were captured over one year, classified manually, and
used as training data. The filter was applied to further week’s email received by the
same individual. The resulting classification table, shown in table 6.1, demonstrates
hm = 1.7% (0.3%− 4.9%), sm = 20% (9.6%− 34.6%). Sahami et al. further examine the
three misclassified ham messages, observing two to be newsletter messages and one to be
a personal message that includes a spam message as an attachment. The test corpus is
unavailable for comparative evaluation.
Ling Spam[6] is an abstraction of 2412 ham messages from a mailing list and 481
spam messages from an individual recipient. We say abstraction because the messages
are stripped of headers and line breaks, converted to lower case, tokenized and stemmed.
The filters tested on the Ling Spam corpus were purpose-built to use it to evaluate specific
machine-learning techniques. Although the results are reported in terms of spam recall,
spam precision and weighted accuracy, it is possible to reconstruct the contingency table
from these results. Table 6.2, for example, recasts the results of Androutsopoulos et al.
[6] in terms of hm and sm.












0 (0-0.12) 34.9 (30.7-39.4) 5.81 (4.98-6.72)
Table 6.2: Androutsopoulos et al. Results
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Filter % Ham Misc. % Spam Misc. % Misc.
SpamAssassin 0 95.4 15.9
Bogofilter 0 59.5 9.9
SpamProbe 0 31.3 5.2
CRM114 54.9 11.2 18.5
Table 6.3: Real Filter Results on Ling Spam corpus
Ling Spam is freely available and has been used in many studies [105, 138, 6, 8]. We
found that real spam filters were, in general, unable to classify the Ling Spam messages
(see table 6.3); we are unaware of how to modify either the corpus or the filters so as to
use them together in a valid experiment.
Androutsopoulos et al.[7] define four public corpora – PU1, PU2, PU3 and PUA –
with a total of 5957 messages (3508 ham and 2449 spam); each corpus abstracts and
also obfuscates email from one recipient, so as to preserve privacy. In addition, repeated
ham messages and spam messages from regular correspondents – about half the spam
and eighty percent of the ham – are discarded in forming the corpus. As for Ling Spam,
experiments using these corpora depend on purpose-built filters. One such filter – Filtron
– was trained on PU3 and tested on real email received by an individual over seven
months. During this interval, 5109 ham and 1623 spam messages were received and
classified. Table 6.4 summarizes the results. Neither Filtron nor the real email corpus is
available for comparative study.








1.0 (0.8-1.3) 10.7 (9.2-12.3) 3.8 (3.3-4.3)
Table 6.4: Filtron Results
The public SpamAssassin corpus[120] consists of 6034 messages – 4149 ham and 1885
spam – gathered from various sources at various times. Although it is not a chronological
sequence of messages delivered to a single recipient, the messages contain original headers
with minor elision for the sake of privacy. Holden[64] used the SpamAssassin corpus
and ten-fold cross-validation to test fourteen open-source filters, including versions of the
six tested here. Holden’s results are summarized in table 6.5. Holden further tested the
filter on one-month’s personal email, again using cross-validation; results are shown in
table 6.6. Holden provides a qualitative description of the misclassified ham messages,
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0.14 (0.05-0.31) 3.4 (2.7-4.3) 1.2 (0.9-1.5)
Table 6.5: Holden Results on SpamAssassin Corpus
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6.8 (3.3-12.2) 0.25 (0.12-0.48) 0.51 (0.31-0.80)
Table 6.6: Holden Results on Personal Email
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Holden Zhang et al.
Filter TCR (λ = 9) Method Best TCR (approx, λ = 9)
Annoyance 8.0 Naive Bayes 1.9
Antispam 1.5 Max. Entropy 15.2
Bayesspam 1.7 Memory Based 7.0
bmf 7.9 SVMlight 12.1










Table 6.7: Holden and Zhang et al. Results on SpamAssassin Corpus
observing a preponderance of messages like welcome advertising, news clippings, mailing
lists, etc. Many other studies have used the SpamAssassin corpus; Meyer & Whateley[87];
Yerazunis[133]; Zhang et al.[138].
Zhang et al.[138] evaluate several learning algorithms on four corpora – Ling Spam,
PU1, SpamAssassin, and ZH1. ZH1 is a private corpus of 1633 Chinese messages with
headers; 428 ham and 1205 spam. Only the TCR statistic is reported (λ = 9 and λ = 999);
from this statistic it is impossible, in general, to recover sm and hm. In the specific case
of λ = 999 we may deduce that the best-ranked classifiers had no ham misclassifications
(i.e. c = 0) and we may use this deduction combined with corpus statistics to compute
hm and sm. TCR for these filters, on the SpamAssassin corpus, was approximately 12.
Suppose c > 0. Because b and c are whole numbers, we have b ≥ 0 and c ≥ 1. We
have TCR = b+dλc+b ≤
1897
999+0 = 1.9, which contradicts the reported value. Therefore c = 0,
b ≈ 158, hm = 0 (0%−0.07%), sm ≈ 8.3% (7.1%−9.7%). The confidence interval for hm
should be interpreted with caution because Zhang et al. adjusted the threshold parameter
θ999 so as to optimize TCR, effectively fixing c = 0 for the corpus data. For λ = 9 we
are unable to deduce the values of b and c, so in table 6.7 we present as TCR these
results, and also Holden’s, on the SpamAssassin corpus. We note that this comparison
is not entirely valid, as the filters for which the threshold and other parameters were not
adjusted to optimize the result (i.e. the filters tested by Holden and, we understand, the
Bayes method of Zhang et al.) are at considerable disadvantage.
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%Ham Misc. % Spam Misc.
Naive Bayes SVM AdaBoost
0.0 5.9 6.2 10.5
0.5 4.1 4.4 8.1
1.0 2.8 3.5 5.6
2.0 2.0 2.2 2.6
5.0 1.1 0.5 1.3
Table 6.8: Tuttle Results
Tuttle et al.[130] evaluate three common machine-learning algorithms – näıve Bayesian
classifiers, support vector machines, and boosted decision trees – within the context of an
enterprise mail system. They deployed a novel architecture to capture email messages and
judgements from several users, keeping this information private and under the control of
the users to whom the messages belonged. Test runs were “pushed” to the users’ corpora,
and only statistics were reported back to the central system. Seven users participated in
the study, and corpora consisting of up to 800 messages per user were subject to ten-fold
cross-validation. Results for each of the seven corpora were computed and the mean of
these results was reported. The primary experiment used individual corpora with 400
messages each, approximately 62% spam, and reported piece-wise ROC curves (see table
6.8) for hm ∈ {0.0%, 0.5%, 1.0%, 2.0%, 5.0%}. Other experiments fixed hm = 1.0% as a
proxy for the operating range. The published averages yield insufficient information to
compute confidence intervals but, we note, the overall sample size of 2800 suggests that
they would be comparable in magnitude to those for Sahami et al. and Androutsopoulos
et al. Tuttle et al. perform a 2-factor analysis of variance and conclude that there is a
significant difference in results among the seven corpora, but not among the three filters.
Kolcz and Alspector[73] model the cost of misclassifying various genres of messages.
This approach stands in contrast to the cost-sensitive methods discussed above, which
assume the cost to be dependent only on whether the message is ham or spam. It
also stands in contrast to ours, in which the test method and quantitative evaluation
measures assume no particular cost model, and message genres are treated qualitatively.
Kolcz and Alspector assembled a corpus of 11408 messages (6043 ham; 5365 spam) which
were labeled according to category; each category was assigned an estimated cost of
misclassification. The corpus was split into training and test sets in a 3:1 ratio. Results
are reported in terms of TCR and ROC analysis. Although they published their intent
to do so, Kolcz and Alspector were unable to publish their corpus due to corporate
restrictions on the data.
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Method/features trec05p-1 trec06p trec07p
Fusion[33, 83] 0.007 0.020
SVM/4-gram[109] 0.008 0.023
ROSVM/4-gram[109, 108] 0.009 0.024 0.009
DMC+LR/4-gram[39] 0.006
LR/4-gram[39] 0.012 0.006
DMC[17, 38] 0.013 0.033 0.008
Perceptron/string[110] 0.017 0.041
PPM[17] 0.019 0.061 0.011
Clustering/string[92] 0.011







Table 6.9: 1-ROC(%) – TREC Public Corpora
6.2 Independent Studies and Methodology
This section contains an overview of independent studies completed between 2004 and
2009. All results are presented using the (1-ROCA)% measure.
TREC Spam Track
Repeated in 2006 and 2007, the TREC Spam Track is the largest and most realistic
laboratory evaluation of spam filters to date. Over the three years of the TREC Spam
Track more than one hundred filters were evaluated and ten corpora (721,461 messages)
were created. Of the created corpora, four are publicly available.1 The results of the
best-performing filters on the public corpora are presented in table 6.9[38].
Each year TREC adds new tasks. The original spam filtering task, immediate feed-
back, is described in Chapter 4. In 2006 a delayed feedback task was introduced. The
delayed feedback task would inform the filter of adjudicated classification only after some
number of additional messages had been classified by the filters. TREC 2006 also intro-
duced an (batch) active learning task in which filters were presented with an unlabeled
1http://trec.nist.gov/data/spam.html
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Team (1-ROCA)%
Lahore University of Management Sciences[68] 4.93
University of Waikato[95] 5.09
Inductis India Pvt Ltd[59] 5.13
National Technical University of Athens
National Technical University of Athens
[128] 6.35
Beihang University[16] 7.23
Table 6.10: ECML/PKDD Discovery Challenge 2006 Task A
Team (1-ROCA)%
University of Waterloo[32] 5.35
National Technical University of Athens
National Technical University of Athens
[128] 8.18
Inductis India Pvt Ltd[59] 9.26
Moscow State University[16] 10.08
Apex Data & Knowledge Management Lab[16] 10.67
Table 6.11: ECML/PKDD Discovery Challenge 2006 Task B
training set and were allowed to choose a set number example for which adjudicated clas-
sification would be given. TREC 2007 introduced an on-line active learning task. Also
introduced was an extreme delayed feedback in which feedback was given immediately
for the first few thousand messages and never given again. TREC 2007 also had a fourth
task, partial feedback, in which feedback was given for only a subset of the messages.
2006 ECML/PKDD Discovery Challenge
The 2006 ECML/PKDD Discovery Challenge[16] consisted of two batch oriented partial
feedback tasks. Task A used a single train set of 4000 messages and tested on three test
sets of 2500, each though only one of the test tests was used for feedback. Task B used
three training sets of 100 each and fifteen test sets of 400 messages each, though on one
of the test sets contain labels. The results for task A are in table 6.10 and task B in table
6.11.
CEAS 2008 Challenge
The 2008 CEAS Live Spam Challenge[112] extended upon the evaluation completed in
the TREC spam tracks. TREC methodology was modified in several ways. First, email
was captured and distributed in real-time. Second, the standard email protocols (SMTP,
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IMAP, POP) were used in place of the toolkit command-line interface. Finally, there
were no limits to the external resources filters could use for the live competition. Four
task were completed:
• 72-hour live email spam filtering competition
• laboratory simulation of the live steam using the same messages
• laboratory evaluation on a large stream of real private data collected by a service
provider
• laboratory active learning on the private data stream.
Tables 6.12, 6.13, 6.14 show the top result for the live competition,laboratory live stream





Logistic Regression + DMC (TREC07-wat3)[39] 0.03840
Heilongjiang Institute of Technology - Entry 1[98] 0.03980
Table 6.12: CEAS 2008 Challenge Live Competition
Team (1-ROCA)%
Communication and Computer Network Lab - Entry 3[26] 0.01781
Heilongjiang Institute of Technology - Entry 2[39] 0.01968
PPM Compression (TREC07-ijsppm)[34] 0.02333
Dynamic Markov Compression(TREC07-wat2)[39] 0.02347
Heilongjiang Institute of Technology - Entry 3[39] 0.02770
Table 6.13: CEAS 2008 Challenge Lab Live Stream
Team (1-ROCA)%
Logistic Regression + DMC (TREC07-wat3)[39] 5.671
Logistic Regression (TREC07-wat1)[39] 5.752
Dynamic Markov Compression (TREC07-wat2)[39] 6.766
IGF (gor Assis Braga) - Entry 2[112] 12.629
Kosmopoulos Aris - Entry 1[112] 28.745
Table 6.14: CEAS 2008 Challenge Lab Private












Table 6.15: Network World Test
Network World Test
Network World[119] conducted a parallel test of 41 commercial spam filters. Over a
two-week period the message traffic to a server was captured, screened for viruses and
backscatter, and passed on to the spam filters under test. In total 11,000 (8027spam,
2386 ham, 600 other) messages were passed to the filters. The 600 other ones that were
rejected due to screening problems, duplicate message identifiers and adjudicators unable
to determine the correct classification. Filters were allowed unlimited access to external
resources normally used. Results are found in table 6.15.
VeriTest
The VeriTest Anti-Spam Benchmark Service[129] provides a service that measures the ef-
fectiveness of anti-spam technologies. Filters are installed and operate normally. VeriTest
send the servers ham mail from real sources and spam from traps. The tests are com-
pleted of a corpus of around 10,000 messages. The results of the 2005 test are in table
6.16.
SEWM
The SEWM 2007 and 2008 Spam Tracks [4, 3] adopt the toolkit and methodology for
large-scale evaluation of Chinese email. SEWM materials and results are published in
Chinese only.
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Vendor fpr(%) fnr(%)
BitDefender 0 3
Email Systems 0 1





Table 6.16: Veritest 2005 Results
6.3 Datasets and Tools
Since 2004 many new spam corpora have been created. The majority of these corpora
have been created using the TREC 2005 public corpora creation methodology. There
has been no real development in evaluation tools other than updates to the TREC Spam
Filtering Evaluation Toolkit.
6.3.1 Corpora
Table 6.17 describes the details of spam corpora that have been used in studies to evaluate
spam filters. Corpora that have public availability are in the public domain and can be
used for future studies; however, corpora with private availability can only be used by
the original authors. If one considers statistical significance, many studies use under-size
corpora. This is especially true for the studies that use large training sets and small test
sets.
• The Enron-spam[86] is a successor to the Ling spam and PU corpora. The corpus
contains chronological email messages from six Enron employees. There are two
forms of the corpus: one with the emails in their raw form, the other with similar
abstractions to Ling Spam and PU corpora. The corpus is divided into six train
and test sets representing the six employees.
• Gen Spam[85] corpus contains training messages (38246), adaptation messages (600)
and test messages (1551). The headers have been reformatted into XML and any
identifying information has been obfuscated.
• The Holden2[64] is a private corpus that contains one month of personal email from
the same source as holden1 but newer mail. The corpus includes qualitative descrip-
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Corpus # email # ham # spam availability source
Holden2 3703 146 3557 private 1 mth personal
ZH1 1633 428 1205 private chinese personal
Gen Spam 40414 9072 32332 public personal sample
SpamGuru 170000 40000 130000 private multiple user personal
Enron-spam 33716 16545 17171 public personal sample
MrX 40048 9038 49086 private 8 mths personal
MrX2 49174 9039 40135 private 7 mths personal
MrX3 161975 8082 153893 private 7 mths personal
trec05p 39399 52790 92189 public personal sample,spam traps
trec06p 37822 12910 24912 public web, traps
trec06c 64620 21766 42854 public chinese mailing list,traps
trec07p 75419 25220 50199 public multiple,personal sample
SB 7006 6231 775 private 1 year personal
SB2 11969 9274 2695 private 1 year personal
TM 170201 150685 19516 private 1+ year personal
Microsoft 915000 ? ? private random sample hotmail
ECML/PKDD(Task A) 11500 5750 5750 public multiple, personal sample
ECML/PKDD(Task B) 6300 3150 3150 public multiple, personal sample
ceas08(private) 198000 90000 109000 private real email from one domain
ceas08(public) 143000 28000 115000 private ham/spam traps
SEWM07(public) 60000 15000 45000 public chinese unknown
SEWM08 70000 20000 50000 public chinese unknown
Table 6.17: Spam Corpora 2004-2009
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tions of the misclassified ham messages, observing a preponderance of messages like
welcome advertising, news clippings, mailing lists, etc.
• ZH1[138] is a private corpus of 1633 Chinese messages with headers; 428 ham and
1205 spam.
• SpamGuru[114] corpus is a collection of mail from 200 IBM employees.
• TREC corpora were created using the corpus creation methodology presented ear-
lier. Results for TREC05p are found in figure 4.7. TREC06p[33] was creating in
two steps, by searching and download ham messages from the web, inject spam
collected from traps to look like the downloaded ham. TREC06c is a collection of
ham from Chinese mailing list and spam from traps. TREC07p[34] includes mail
sample from multiple users as well has spam from traps.
• SB[30] and SB2[33] are two corpora of personal email from the same user over two
different periods, 2005, 2006 respectfully, The corpora is in raw unmodified spool
form. SB and SB2 were also created using the TREC corpus creation methodology.
SB was created for TREC 2005 and SB2 was created for TREC 2006.
• TM[30] is personal email from one person over a period of more than a year. The
corpus is in raw unmodified spool form. TB was used in TREC05.
• Microsoft[135] corpus is a collection of random hotmail over a period of five months.
The messages were converted to small sets of features. A 3% human classification
error rate was found.
• SEWM07(public)[3] and SEWM08[4] are a collection of Chinese mail used in a
Chinese version of the TREC spam track. The corpora appear to be in TREC
spam filter evaluation toolkit format.
• The CEAS challenge used two different corpora; one public and one private. CEAS08
public[112] is a collection of email accumulated through both spam and ham traps.
CEAS08 private[112] is a collection of randomly sampled email from one domain.
The gold standard for the corpus reproduced actual user feedback. This include
delays, partial and incorrect feedback. CEAS08 corpora were also created using the
TREC corpus creation methodology.
• The creation of MrX corpora is described in Chapter 3. MrX2[33], and MrX3[34]
are corpora from the same user and in the same format as MrX but are newer email
streams.
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• ECML/PKDD corpora are emails in a bag-of-words vector space representation.
Attributes are the term frequencies of the words. Words with less than four occur-
rences are removed from the data set resulting in a dictionary size of about 150,000
words. Only 6500 of data set A are label and only 700 of data set B.
6.3.2 Tools
The TREC Spam Filtering Evaluation Toolkit was been updated to include the ability to
delay feedback, give partial feedback and perform active on-line learning. In 2006 delay
and partial feedback were added by Cormack [33]. In 2007 active on-line learning was
added by Sculley [34, 106]. Sculley and Cormack measure the effect of training label
errors on on-line filter performance [107].
6.4 Evolution of Spam Filtering
On-line spam filter effectiveness has improved considerably, arguably due to our stan-
dardized evaluation, test data and tools. Several methods have improved on the best-
performing filters of 2004:
• orthogonal sparse bi-gram feature engineering with threshold training [9, 117];
• on-line logistic regression using gradient descent[53];
• on-line support vector machines with character 4-gram features [108];
• sequential data compression models [17];
• spam filter fusion [83].
Figure 6.1 shows the top ten independently evaluated filters for 2004, 2005, 2006 and
2007. 2004 filters were evaluated in the study On-line Supervised Spam Filter Evaluation.
2005, 2006 and 2007 filters were evaluated at TREC 2005, 2006 and 2007 respectively.
All evaluations were completed on one of the MrX email streams. 2004 and 2005 filters
used MrX, 2006 filters used MrX2 and 2007 filters used MrX3. The squares represent
individual filters while the triangles represent the log-odds fusion of all the filters evaluated
at TREC. Even as filters improve, fusion still outperforms the best filter by a significant
margin.
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Figure 6.1: Spam Filters Improvement(1-ROCA%) - Top 10 per Year
Chapter 7
Conclusion
Sound quantitative evaluation of spam filtering has been central to improvements in filter
effectiveness since 2004. From our first study to date, the best individual filters have
improved substantially. Even as individual filters improve, fusion continues to improve
on the best by a substantial margin.
The specific contributions of this work are:
• A realistic methodology for the evaluation of on-line spam filters with user feedback,
incorporating a standard method of simulating filter deployment and a standard set
of effectiveness measures;
• The first comparative study of on-line filter performance on a large, comprehensive,
real email stream;
• Deployment of the methodology through a free toolkit and the TREC Spam Track;
• Two archival corpora for filter evaluation, one private and one public, and a method-
ology for creating them;
• Spam Filter Fusion, which consistently improves on all other techniques.
Limitations of the work suggest opportunities for enhancement along several lines:
• The laboratory environment mandates certain simplifying assumptions which may
be unrealistic. In particular, the simulation of feedback assumes an ideal user who
promptly reports filter errors to the filter. A more realistic assumption is that users
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report some but not all errors, and are more likely to report false negatives than
false positives, because the latter are rare and more likely to remain unnoticed. The
toolkit has proven amenable to enhancements that better emulate user behaviour;
the limiting factor in such efforts is coming up with and validating a model of user
behaviour to be simulated using the tools.
• Restrictions on external resource access for the sake of repeatability preclude the
evaluation of techniques like RBLs and collaborative filtering. A hybrid approach,
employed by CEAS, tests such filters in real-time, capturing the messages for use
in later laboratory evaluation. In this way, the effectiveness of content-based filters
may be compared to that of filters relying on system-wide resources. An alterna-
tive approach is to simulate the behaviour of the entire system, as proposed by
Aycock[11, 91]. A trade off exists between the comprehensiveness of the simulation
and the realism of its components.
• The CEAS experiments and others suggest that filters employing user feedback are
more effective than those that do not. It has been suggested that a substantial
number of users are unable or unwilling to provide feedback. We suggest that this
thesis is far from established, and that the design and evaluation of interfaces to
engage users is a promising avenue for future research. The issue of how to improve
filter effectiveness without user feedback is, in itself, well worthy of further study.
The intellectual uncertainty in this effort is the discovery of the techniques, as the
methodology is easily applied to their evaluation. All that needs to be done is
to suppress user feedback during the evaluation. Batch evaluation may also be
simulated using the toolkit [35].
• The laboratory environment largely precludes the evaluation of popular techniques
like greylisting and challenge-response which engage the sender. At the time of
writing, claims regarding the efficacy of these methods are unsubstantiated by sound
measurement. In particular, hm is difficult to measure, as messages deemed to be
spam are never delivered.
• It is possible to compare filters outside the confines of the laboratory environment.
In this context, repeatability is established using statistical inference to bound the
imprecision in measurement due to external variances. Standard methods and ex-
perimental designs of social and medical research may be employed [103]. These
methods involve orders of magnitude more time and expense than laboratory eval-
uation, and are subject to their own limitations. Nevertheless, they yield valuable
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confirmation (or refutation) of the results of laboratory evaluation. Possible designs
include:
– Randomized controlled trials, in which users from a source population are
selected at random to employ different filtering techniques. Randomized tri-
als are among the most effective, but also the most intrusive and expensive,
designs.
– Crossover studies, in which a user switches between filters, and the results are
compared. Like randomized controlled trials, crossover studies are intrusive;
however, a much smaller number of users is required to achieve adequate sta-
tistical repeatability. Crossover studies are limited by crossover effects, in that
the user’s behaviour with respect to one filter is influenced by prior use of the
other.
– Cohort studies in which the results of filters that happen to be in use by par-
ticular users are compared. Cohort studies are less intrusive than randomized
or crossover designs, but some method of capturing filter results is required.
Controlling for factors predisposing users to a particular filter is a substantial
challenge.
– Case-control studies examine the characteristics of users and filters based on
observed outcomes. For example, one might solicit contributions to a spam
archive, and determine the filter that was used by the contributor along with
that filter’s result. These results may be combined to estimate the effectiveness
of the filters involved. Case-control studies are among the cheapest to conduct,
but controlling for confounding factors is a formidable challenge.
• Regardless of the experimental design, the standard measures of filter effective-
ness are applicable. That said, the measures cover only certain aspects of filter
performance. The resource consumption and delay associated with filter use may
be important considerations both from the system and user perspective. Different
messages may have different value to the user; aptly modeling this value remains
an outstanding research area. While the summary measures ROCA and LAM are
robust to obvious differences in deployment parameters, and yield similar filter
rankings, they may not aptly reflect effectiveness in any particular situation.
Overall, I conclude that while spam filters are effective enough to be useful for their
intended purpose, there is still much room for improvement. The methods and tools de-
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scribed serve as impetus for the improvement of filter effectiveness and of filter evaluation
methods.
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